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ABSTRACT
The thesis is concerned with the logical form of ~011tences
of natural language, in particular, with how quantificational
aspects of sentences in natural language are to be represented in
a theory of grammar. The question is explored with respect to a
circumscribed, but interesting, class of sentences. The theory
of grammar within which the question is pursued is a version of
Chomsky's theory of government and binding, as extended in recent
work by Higginbotham. An especially important feature of the
theory for the question treated is that syntactic and semantic
principles are formulqted in autonomous terms.
In the first chapter, the theory of grammar adopted for the
analysis is outlined. A class of sentences, called "simple
sentences", is defined on a pllrely syntactic basis in the second
chapter. Established in the course of defining this class is the
fact that cardinal numerals are adjectives and not determiners
(and hence, not quantifiers). The third chapter contains the
semantic principles governing the interpretation of lexical items
occurring in simple sentences. This leads, in the fourth
chapter, to a statement of tIle recursive principles of
interpretation for simple sentences. Included here is also a
treatment of the semantics of the collective and distributive
readings of plural noun phrases. This treatment elaborates
earlier work by Higginbotham, drawing on data and insights from
Langendoen and L. Carlson. The upshot is that an array of data,
previously seemingly heterogeneous, is brought within the purview
of a few simple principles, formulated in terms of the notion of
a plurality cover, a kind of cover only slightly richer than a
partition. In the fifth chapter, the previous analysis is
extended to a still larger class of sentences, which contain
so-caJ,led "f loa ted quant i f :~ers", adj ect i val phrases, and
prepositional phrases. This extension affords, in the sixth
chapter, an analysis of sentences, which requires no such
complication. Finally, in the conclusion, it is observed that
for the class of sentences examined in the thesis, nothing more
elaborate than standard rE,stricted quantifiers is required to
represent the i r quant i f iC<t t ional aspects; in fact, t t tu rna au t,
were higher order quantifiers adopted, as suggested ~y Langendoen
and L. Carlson, to capture the semantics of plural l'lOUr, phrases,
or branching quantifiers, as suggested by Hintikka, to ca~ture
- 2 -
the alleged semantics of certain complex sentences, essential
syntactic and semantic insights, which are independently
grounded, would be jeopardi~ed.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the logical form of sentences of natural language?
This question, first raised almost a century ago, has come to the
fore of philosophic and linguistic debate. Nothing like a
definitive answer is even in sight. Indeed, if the current
perception of the complexity of natural language is a guide, itt
will be a long time coming.
Attention of those interested in the logical form of natural
language's sentences has focussed, in recent years, on a more
narrow, and perhaps more immediately tractable, question: how
are quantificational aspects of sentences in natural language to
be represented? The kinds of sentences looked at from this point
of view are many, and the forms of representation proposed
diverse. No one work could take in all of the data and all of
the proposals bearing on the question. My aim is modest: I wish
to answer this question for a small, but interesting, class of
sentences. I intend to do so by setting out a comprehensive
syntactic and semantic analysis for the sentences of this class.
Thus, my proposal concerning the form of representation of the
quantificational aspects of these sentences must ultimately be
evaluated with respect to its place in more comprehensive
theories whose outlines are now only dimly seen.
The analysi.s developed or adopted in this thesis differs in
two major ways from some others aiming at the same or similar
- 8 -
ends. First, semantic and syntactic analyses are on an equal
footing. In other words, the analysis does not regard the syntax
as a trivial projection of the semantics or the semantics as a
trivial projection of the syntax. Instead, they are viewed as
autonomous systems which interact. Second, the semantic analysis
of allegedly quantificational aspects of sentences resists the
proliferation of quantifiers. The provenience of this resistance
is not any a priori conviction banning from the forms of
representation certain types of quantifiers, but rather an a
prior~ principle requiring the best fit of the facts with the
theory within whose confines the facts are being explored. As it
turns out, representation of any of the sentences surveyed below
by second orde~ quantifiers or by branching quantifiers would
seriously jeopardize well and independently grounded principles
pertaining to the syntax and semantics of the sentences I am to
treat. To show this, is what, among other things, this thesis
will do. At the moment, I only limn the issues and foreshadow
the results.
A central issue of this thesis is the proper treatment of
the semantic properties of plural noun phrases. In much previous
work on this issue, higher order quantification has been adopted
as the appropriate form of their representation. Langendoen
(1978) studies simple sentences with plural noun phrases and with
- 9 -
reciprocal and reflexive pronouns. He shows that no satisfactory
treatment of their semantics can avoid sets in one form or
another. More exactly, he shows that collective and distributive
readings of plural noun phrases and the reciprocal relation
(induced by the reciprocal pronoun on the verb of which it is an
object) cannot be defined over individuals. His option is to
appeal to hidden quantifiers of second order predicate logic.
Lauri Carlson (1982) broadens the compass of data and refines the
accurdcy of the statement of the semantic facts. He too uses the
quantjfiers of second order predicate logic, but within the
larger framework of game theoretic semantics. Drawing on the
array of data and on the insights of these two treatments, I
provide an alternative analysis which is an elaboration of a
8uggestion by Higginbotham (1981). He proposes that a plural
noun phrase be interpreted as a set and that the collective and
distributive readings to which it is liable depend on which
subsets of the set interpreting it the predicate in question is
true of. In pursuing his idea, I make explicit just what kind of
subsets of a set interpreting a noun phrase is pertinent to the
evaluation of the interpretation of its predicate: the family of
these subsets is what I call a "plurality cover". The set of
plurality covers of a given set is intermediate between the set
of its covers and the set of its partitions. It forms a partial
- 10 -
order with a least and a greatest element.
There are several attractive features of this approach.
First, it is a simple and comprehensive treatment of the
collective and distributive readings of plural noun phrases and
it dovetails nicely with already established semantic and
syntactic principles. In particular, it retains Higginbotham's
(1981) appealing principle for the interpretation of sentences
with reciprocal pronouns, which retains the intuitive idea that a
reciprocal relation holds of all distinct pairs of a set. Also,
the facts pertaining to the interpretation of singular and plural
quantified noun phrases fall to the same analysis, supplemented
only by principles which are already established and
independently grounded. Next, this treatment of plural noun
phrases affords a way to overcome two anomalies resulting from
taking cardinal numerals as quantifiers. The one is that phrases
with cardinal numerals do not seem to obey principles governing
the assignment of scope to quantifiers; that is to say, they are
liable to more readings than there are available assignments of
scope. The other is that cardinal numerals fail to pattern with
the syntactic distribution of paradigmatic quantifiers. Finally,
witnout any further elaboration of the syntactic representation
upon which semantic interpretation is to be done, there is
available a fully compositional implementation of all the
- 11 -
principles of interpretation adopted or developed in this
thesis.
Another issue is one raised by Hintikka (1973)0 He has
argued that there are sentences in natural language, in English
specifically, which require branching quantifiers for their
proper representation. At the time Hintikka argued for his
claim, the syntax of the scope of quantifiers in natural
language, and in English in particular, was just beginning to get
sustained philosophic and linguistic scrutiny_ Though
considerable doubt has been cast on whether or not the sentences
adduced by Hintikka mean what he says they mean (e.g., Fauconnier
1975), nonetheless no syntactic and semantic analysis of his
sentences has been given. In part, this is because no systematic
syntactic treatment of quantifiers and their scope had been
given. This situation was changed by May (1977). In light of
the rapidly accumulating analysis of both the syntax and
semanttcs of quantifiers and their scope, the time is right for a
re-assessment of Hintikka's claim and evidence. And it is to
this re-assessment that I also turn. As it happens, the
principles of this thesis vindicate the doubts ~aised against
those of Hintikka's sentences which fall within the purview of
this thesis.
- 12 -
Obviously, my treatment of the two issues stated above is
not ab ovo. My point of departure is a version of Chomsky's
theory of government and binding, more precisely, a version of
the theory's development due to Higginbotham (1983). Those parts
of the theory and Higginbotham's extensions of it which are
germane to the task are outlined in the first chapter. The next
major step is to define an interesting class of sentences, which
I call "simple sentences", and to furnish them with a semantic
analysis. The analysis includes all the principles needed for
the interpretation of simple noun phrases, with their diversity
of collective and distributive readings, in simple sentences.
The syntax of simple sentences is set out in the second chapter;
the principles for interpreting lexical items in most categories
of lexical items which occur in these sentences is stated in the
third chapter; and the principles for interpreting the simple
sentences themselves are given in the fourth. In the fifth
chapter, I extend the analysis to encompass a still larger class
of sentences among which are to be found those of Hintikka. I
confront, in the sixth chapter, Hintikka's claim and evidence,
showing that his arguments do not sustain his claim and that his
sentences yield to a well-grounded analysis which obviates their
reprftsentation l)y branching quantifiers. Finally, I conclude by
returning to my central claim, namely, that the proper semantic
- 13 -
representation for the class of sentences treated in this thesis
requires neither second order nor branching quantifiers.
- 14 -
CHAPTER ONE
THE THEORY OF GRAMMAR AND LOGICAL FORM
1.0 Introduction
If it is tautological that a theory about natural language
is a theory about natural language, and not a theory about, say,
logic, then it should go without saying that standard logical
notation when applied to natural language is not theoretically
priviledged. After all, syntax itself is a form of notation.
Once this point is fixed in mind, there is no harm in using names
of the structures of logic to identify analogous structures in
language. And it is in this analogical sense that one can talk
about operators and quantifiers, as well as their scopes, in
natural language. I shall do so in what follows. Moreover, once
one has so extended one's use of these terms commandeered from
logic, there is no harm in availing oneself of them to suggest,
through their analogy with elements of natural language, further
analogies, But, in the end, it is the syntactic structures of
language which constitute the object of stlJdy.
The central empirical problem of this thesis is to account
for the quantificational aspects of certain sentences in terms of
their structure. Any such analysis presupposes a linguistic
framework within which the analysis is to be carried out. This
chapter will make available to the reader the necessary
linguistic background.
Now while it is obvious that a treatment of the
quantificational aspects of sentences of natural language
requires that the pertinent linguistic details of the theory
within which the treatment is being carried out be made explicit,
it may not be obvious that the theory's very framework need be
made explicit. But it does, and for two different sorts of
reasons. The first is general. Different frameworks lead to
different t~eories. This now commonplace observation among
historians and philosophers of science, proves particularly
pertinent when discussing issues and theories of a discipline
where frameworks abound, such as linguistics, for in such
disciplines, theories must be explicitly situated in their
framework if they are to be understandable, let alone convincing,
to those of a different persuasion. The second reason is mo~e
specific: part of the treatment of the problem aCul~essed in the
thesis involves a re-assessment of what counts as l:lnguistic data
in light of the basic framework. Thus, a discussion of the
underlying linguistic framework of the thesis is indirectly
required for a proper grasp of the grammatical theory within
~ 16 -
which the problems addressed are tackled, and is directly
required for the treatment itself to be understood.
1.1 The Linguistic Framework
The two central points to be understood about the linguistic
framework adopted here are: what it takes its object of study to
be and how it proposes to pursue the study of its object. The
exposition must proceed first with an exposition of the object of
study, and second with its pursuit.
It has been traditionally assumed that language is the
proper object of linguistics. This is a natural assumption since
utterances, which make up language, are immediate in our
experience of the world. But, what is immediate in experience
often is not what is tundamental in theory -- an observation made
long ago by Aristotle (Physics Book I, Chapter 1, 184a 17ff.) and
borne out in the development of the physical sciences since him.
And it is a shift away from what is immediate in experience,
namely the utterances of language, to what, it is thought, is
fundamental in theory, namely, the human capacity to use
language, which characterizes much of the work in linguistics
after the heyday of structuralism, in particular, all at the work
going under the name of "generative-transformational
- 17 ~
linguistics." Since the linguistic framework adopted in this
thesis is based on the view that the fundamental object of study
in linguistics is the human capacity to use language, it is
appropriate to set forth the basis of this view.
The question of how humans acquire their capacity to use
language can be seen as an instance of a larger question. The
larger question is this: if a mature organism has a capacity,
which at its inception it cannot exercise and at a later time
can, then how does it come to exercise this capacity? Thus, one
might ask how cats come to hunt rodents, birds to make nests, or
salmon to swim up river to spawn eggs? Clearly there are only
two dimensions along which to search for pertinent facts:
experience and innate structure. Equally clear is that facts
along either dimension alone are not sufficient for answering
this larger question. Experience by itself is not sufficient,
for an organism which is not disposed to develop a capacity can
never develop it. Cats do not build nests; birds do not swim up
stream to spawn eggs. Also, innate structure by itself is not
sufficient, for ex hypothesi the organism at inception cannot
exercise the capacity. So, the question becomes: what balance
between innate structure and experience is needed to bring about
the organism's ability to exercise the capacity which it
eventually acquires? For there to be an answer, two of three
parameters must be fixed. Therefore, in order to thus ascertain
what the innate structure is, one is obliged to fix what the
capacity is which the organism comes to exercise and what kind of
experience is pertinent to that capacity. If one pursues this
line of inquiry, then one might try to construct a device (like
the one diagrammed below) to simulate this process.
INPUT (stimulus) --->
INNATE
STRUCTURE
Figure 1
---> OUTPUT (capacity)
Assuming that humans acquire a capacity to use and understand
language, one can put this problem into the next format:
INPUT linguistic --~>
stimulus
INNATE
LINGUISTIC ---> OUTPUT
STRUCTURE
Figure 2
- 19 -
linguistic
capacity
Thus framed, the problem poses two antecedent problems, in
accordance with the more general framing laid out just above: to
ascertain what experience is relevant to acquiring the use of
language and to ascertain what the capacity attained is. The
scope of the latter inquiry requires some elaboration of what a
capacity is and how it relates to behavior.<l>
A capacity, so hypothesized, can be viewed as a system of
subcapacities. Such a system, like the capacity itself, is an
abstraction. One goes beyond abstraction as licensed by rational
inquiry per se, when one addresses the question of what the
sub-capacities are and how they are related to one another. The
former question is an empirical one inasmuch as any answer to it
must be subject to factual confirmation. The latter question is
empirical too: the relationship among the subcapacities could be
such that they cannot be characterized in independent terms, or
it could be such that they can be. These alternatives ~~re
extremes of a gamut of possibilities. Which of these
alternatives one is to select in formulating an initial
hypothesis is a methodological question, the answer to which is
obvious: in the absence of evidence to the contrary, assume the
subcapacities to be completely autonomous from one another, that
- 20 -
is, the terms in which one is characterized are completely
independent of those in which the others are characterized.
Notice, however, to say that subcapacities are autonomous from
one another is not to say that they do not interact! On the
contrary, to say that the subcapacities are autonomous is to say
that the complexity of behavior ascribed to the capacity in
question can be factored into the contribution of interacting
subcapacities, each based on principles, hopefully simple, which
can be stated in their own independent terms.
All this applies to the human capacity to use and understand
language. As was just shown, it is a routine matter of rational
inquiry to regard this capacity as complex and to see it as
abstractly constituted from subcapacities. It is usual to assume
these subcapacities to include the capacity to remember, the
capacity to form beliefs (doxic capacity), the capacity to
conceive objects (conceptual capacity), and the capacity to form
grammatical sentences (grammatical capacity). This fqctoring is,
of course, an empirical hypothesis. Whether or not these
capacities are autonomous from one another is a further empirical
quest~on. The starting point of generative linguistics has been
not only that the grammatical capacity, so-called "Universal
Grammar" (UG), is autonomous with respect to other capacities
pertinent to the production and processing of the flow of speech,
- 21 -
but also that UG is itself a system of autonomous components, or
modules.<2>
An especially important point arises from the foregoing for
the treatment of the quantificational aspects of the sentences of
natural language studied in this thesis. It is an implication
concerning linguistic data on the one hand and the interaction of
UG and the human doxic and conceptual capacities on the other.
Primary linguistic data is assumed to consist of judgments by
speakers of the deviance (or non-deviance) of expressions in
their language. In light of the view which takes as its object
the human capacity to use and understand language, the
provenience of these judgments is not trivial to ascertain. That
is, although judgments of deviance are certainly facts ab0ut the
human capactiy for language, nonetheless it need not be obvious
to which sUb-capacity these facts pertain. Deviance may reflect
on syntax, semantics, or pragmatics, or it may not reflect on UG
at all, but rather on the components whereby beliefs are formed
and objects conceived. One of the results of this thesis is that
many judgments of deviance with regard to sentences containing
plural noun phrases have their basis, not in UG, but in the doxic
and conceptual components.
Now, I stated above that the factoring of a capacity into a
- 22 -
system of autonomous sub-capacities (modules or components) is an
empirical hypothesis. It is hard to imagine that one could
question whether or not humans have a capacity to remember, to
form beliefs, or to conceive of objects of certain kinds. Yet,
it has been a matter of controversy whether or not humans have an
autonomous capacity to form grammatical sentences. However,
there are facts, which, when properly marshalled, make the
existence of such an autonomous capacity nearly certain and also
place significant constraints on any putative hypothesis of what
the capacity is.
I shall now marshall these facts. First, no child is more
disposed to learn one language rather than another. A child
raised in a community where only Marathi is spoken will acquire
competence in Marathi as quickly and as easily as he would
Chinese, had he been raised in a community where only Chinese is
spoken (all other things being equal). Secondly, the structure
of a language, over which a child gains mastery, is both abstract
from its acoustic signal and complex. This is illustrateQ by
such sentences as
(1) The mother of the girl and the boy will leave.
It is in virtue of structure, constituent structure, that this
~ 23 -
same string, when uttered, is liable to two distinct
interpretations: namely, there is a mother of a girl and a boy
and she will leave (compare: the mother of the girl and the boy
is leaving); and there are a boy and a mother of a girl and they
will leave (compare: ·the boy and the mother of the girl are
leaving). Thirdly, whereas the structure of language is both
abstract from its acoustic signal and complex, competence to use
these structures is acquired by a child in a short span of time,
through little exposure to signals carrying examples of the
structure; and much of the information about the structure
conveyed by the signals is deficient. In other words, many of
these sentences to which the child is exposed are ill-formed:
they are half-sentences, they are interrupted sentences, they are
unfinished sentences. Moreover, the exposure the child has by
the time he has acquired linguistic competence is rather
impoverished, especially in view of the abstract nature of his
competence. Finally, whereas the resulting competence is uniform
across the community of speakers of which the child is a member,
nonetheless his acquisition of that competence is independent of
his intelligence, motivation, and emotional make-up.<3>
In light of these facts, the following limits are placed on
any 'hypothesis about the innate structure by which humans acquire
competence in their language. The innate structure cannot be so
rich as to predispose a child to acquire competence in one
language over another. Nor can the innate structure be so poor
as to fail to account for the rapid acquisition of competence by
q child, given the abstract and uniform nature of the competence,
the quality of his exposure, the poverty of his exposure, and the
independence of his acquisition from his intelligence, motivation
and emotional make-up. In short, this innate structure cannot be
so rich as to preclude the acquisition of some attested language
but it must be rich enough to ensure that one can acquire any
attested language within the limits of time, data, and access to
data.
Of course, those facts do not determine a unique hypothesis
of UG, they only place constraints on possible hypotheses.
Indeed, over the years there has been a succession of theories of
UG. This succession has been marked by the further factoring of
UG into autonomous sub-components or modules, which, in turn, has
enriched the empirical basis of the theory. I now turn to the
version of UG adopted here.
1.2 The Theory of Universal Grammar
The view adopteq here is, in broad outline, a version of the
extended standard theory found in Lectures on Government and
- 25 -
Binding (Chomsky 1981). Below, I shall limn enough of that view
to permit me to undertake my task. What is sketched is not
complete. Details are omitted, because they are irrelevant here;
Qr they are postponed to later in the thesis, because they Cqn be
more succinctly and aptly stated there. Moreover, some of what
is said here will be modified later; such things are simplifying
assumptions aimed at helping one eschew unnecessary prolixity and
complexity at an early stage of exposition. B'inally, what is now
set out is assumed; many arguments for this view are found
elsewhere and need not be repeated here.
The theory of syntax adopted here gives the theory of
universal grammar (UG) the first place of importance. UG, in
this view, consists in a finite set of universal principles, or
schemata, and finite sets of parameters, each associated with a
universal princip~e. It is these principles and parameters which
constitute the natural and initial human linguistic endowment.
Instantiation of a universal principle, or schema, with values
drawn from its associated set of parameters yields a particular
principle. An instantiation of all the principles of UG yields a
core grammar, that is, the grammar of a possible human language.
Thus, the acquisition of linguistic competence is the
instantiation of the principles of UG, which is done on the basis
of information from the environment. Finally, what is generated
- 26 -
from a core grammar, the so-called "unmark.ed case", is to be
distingushed from idiosyncracies, the so-called "mark.ed case".
The actual structure of UG is conceived to be made up of a
number of components, as represented below.
DS ------------> SS -----------> LF
PF
Figure 3
The lexicon, as the word suggests, is a dictionary: it provides
the lexical building blocks of sentences. Associated with each
lexical item is an entry specifying a phonological matrix, a
categorial label (i.e., whether the item is a noun, verb,
adjective, preposition, etc.), a subcategorization frame,
argument structure, thematic roles, as well as idiosyncracies of
the item (e.g., the plural form of medium is media)~ To say that
the lexicon is the repository of lexical idiosyncracies does not
mean that it is not governed by systematic principles; to the
contrary, recent research shows that it is. But pursuit of this
is out of place here. DS (alias, Deep Structure) provides some
- 27 -
of the structures into which the co~stituents of a sentence can
be organized. Each such structure can be represented by a phrase
marker. These structures are specified in accordance with
X-Theory. Again, since these details of LGB are not required for
the analysis of the kinds of sentences treated in this thesis, I
omit further discussion of it and refer the reader to the
relevant literature (Jackendoff 1977a, 1977b). Now, the lexicon
is related to the constituent structure provided by DS through
so-called lexical insertion: the free assignment of lexical items
to a phrase marker under the proviso that the specifications of
the lexical item's entry be compatible with the categorial
environment of the phrase marker. Next, SS (alias, Surface
Structure) is obtained from OS by so-called movement rules. A
movement rule is essentially an amalgam of three basic operations
per"formed on a phrase marker: erase, write, and adjoin. Notice
that on this view, substitution is an amalgam of erase and
write. The schema from which particular movement rules are
obtained is: move ~. For a particular language and a
particular, ol takes on a value from the syntactic categories.
In English, ~ can be either a noun phrase (NP) or any phrase
containing "+WH" formative, in the case of the mapping from DS to
SSe In the case of the mapping from SS to LF in English, c;( takes
on the value of Q (the category: quantifier). In PF (Phonetic
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Form) one obtains the final phonetic representation of the
grammar. This component of the grammar is not germane here and
it will not be discussed. LF (Logical Form) is obtained from SS,
again by movement rules, and will be discussed in much detail
below, as will be SSe
1.2.1 DS to 88<4>
Let me return to those parts of UG which are germane to the
topic of this thesis. I begin with the theory of the mapping
from DS to SSe When ~ takes on the value of NP, the movement can
be seen to consist of two substitutions: an empty element for a
non-empty element, and the non-empty element for another empty
one (in accordance with specific constraints). The realization
of the basic passive structure is an example of NP movement in
English. Consider a phrase marker, like the following, in DS:
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( 2 )
§
COM~ ~S
I /1
-WH NP AUX VP
v~Jp~PP
/\ I~
PET N P NP
I'"PET N
e e was poured the ghee by the brahmin
The element below
( 3 )
NP
e
replaces a subtree from the DS phrase marker, namely,
(4 )
NP/""DET N
I I
the ghee
- 30 -
to yield
(5 )
s
/'\
COMP S
I /\
-WH NP AUX VPv/Jp~PP
/~
P NP
/\
DErr N
e e was poured e by the brahmin
The element replaced, namely (4), now replaces the subtree in the
phrasemarker which is of the same form as (3) to yield
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( 6 )
COM~S~S
I /1
-WH NP AUX
/\
DET N
e the ghee was
VP
v/Jp~PP/"""P NP/"'"DET NI I
poured e by the brahmin
When ~ takes the value of +WH, there are two cases to be
treated: one when +WH is an interrogative pronoun, and one when
it is an interrogative adjective, to use traditional
terminology. To see how this works, consider this phrase marker
in DS which contains an interrogative pronoun:
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(7 )
/8",
COMP S
I / ~
-WH NP VP
I /~_
N V S ·co~ ~s
I /l~
+WH NP AUX VP
I /~
N V NP
I
N
I
e I know e Eric will do what
As before, there is a double substitution. An element of the
form of (3) substitutes for the subtree in (7), namely,
(8 )
NP
I
N
I
what
And it, in turn, substitutes for the subtree in (7), namely,
( 9 )
+WH
I
e
to yield the following element of SS:
(10)
/s'"
COMP S
I /~
-WH NP VP
1 v/ ~s
. COM( ~s
I /I~
+WH NP AUX VP
I /\
N V NP
I
e I know what Eric will do e
Second, consider the case where the phrase marker in DS contains
an interrogative adjective instead.
( 11 )
e I know e Eric will see which man
It yields this:
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(12)
s
co~~s
I /~
-WH NP VP
I /'~_N V /S
COMP
I
Np...------.
/\
DET N
SNP~~~VP
I /\
N v NP
e I know which man Eric will see e
Notice that what has been moved is not the subtree
(13 )
DET
which
but rather a subtree containing (13), namely,
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( 14 )
NP
/"'"DET N
, ,
which man
This results from the formulation of the rule of move where
what triggers the movement is the +WH formative but what must be
moved is the first phrase containing it, in this case, the noun
phrase "which man".
1.2.2 S8 and Conditions on 88<5>
Notice that in the representation of the phrase marker (12),
there is, in addition to the lines indicating the dominance
relation, a directed arrow linking the node from which ttle
movement took place to the node to which the movement took
place. This is not only a notational convenience permitting one
to collapse a pair of phrase markers, connected through movement,
into one, but it also forms the basis for representing a relation
which is defined over argument positions in a phrase marker of
ss. This relation, called "linking", is a binary, asymmetric (and
hence, irreflexive) relation<6> permitted between any two
argument positions in a phrase marker at SS. However, such a
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relation must contain, in addition, all pairs of nodes paired
through movement from DS to 58. Thus, one may represent this
relation by arrows freely assigned to argument positions in the
SS phrase marker; if the phrase marker in question is the output
of a non-vacuous application of move ~ , applied to an element of
ns, there will be, in addition, links created by the movement.
The point is perhaps best seen when illustrated.
(15)
/
DET
/8
COMP ~s
/~
p. /VP
V ~§
CO/~S
I /~
-WH NP VP
I /"'"
N V
which man e thinks e God
N
I
loves him
The link of N~ to N~ results automatically from movement;
whereas the link of N~ to N~ resulcs from the application of a
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rule: link. The relation of antecedence is now defined by the
relation of linking.
(16) Definition of the Relation of Antecedence
x is an antecedent of y if and only if (1) Y is
linked to x or (2) there is a z such that y is linked
to z and x is an antecedent of z.
Thus, in (15), NP is an antecedent of NP since NP is linked to
NP and NP is an antecedent of NP (since NP is linked to NP ).
In short, the relation of antecedence is the transitive closure
of the relation of linking.
Whereas the relation of linking is freely created between
argument positions in a phrase marker at ss, the relation of
antecedence is subject to a certain constraint:
(17) Condition on Antecedence
If x a-commands y, then y is not an antecedent
of x.
C-command is a relation between nodes in a phrase marker. It is
an irreflexive relation and it obtains between a node and any of
the nodes dominated by the first branching node dominating the
node in question. In other words,
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(18) Definition of the Relation of C-command<7>
x c-commands y if and only if (1) x ~ y,
(2) neither x nor y dominates the other, and
(3) there is a branching node z different from
x and y which is the first branching node dominating
x also dominating y.
In (15), N~ a-commands N~ and NP3 ; NPz a-commands NP) • But NPl.
does not a-command N~ and N~ does not a-command either N~ or
N~ • The upshot of this for the antecedence relation is that
while linking permits NPz. to be linked to NPa ' NP3 could not be
the antecedent of .N~ since N~ a-commands N~ , which violates
( 16 ) •
Besides antecedence, there is another relation germane to
the main issue of the thesis and to the exposition at hand,
namely, the relation of dependence. It is defined in terms of
the relation of antecedence and dominance.
(19) Definition of the Relati,on of Dependence
x depends ~ y if and only if (1) Y is
dominated by an antecedent of x or (2) there
is a z such that x depends on z and z depends on y.
In other words, the relation of dependence is the transitive
closure of the relation of being dominated by an antecedent.
Applying this definition to the example below, one sees that
"his" depends on "Joan".
- 40 ,...
(20)
s
COM( ""8
I ~
-·WH VP
/ "'-N V S/
COMP
I
-WH
e Joan hopes that her husband hangs up
I
his clothes
NPt is the antecedent of DET3 , hence DET, depends on N~ . N~
dominates DET t • And so DET3 depends on DETt • N~, in turn, is
an antecedent of DETt , so DET3 depends on NP, •
Now, in terms of this relation, another constraint is
imposed.
(21) Condition on Dependence
No node may depend on itself.
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The point here is simply that if antecedence provides the
reference for a term which cannot refer on its own, and if the
antecedent is contained in a larger referential expression which
depends on the original term whose interpretation one is trying
to determine, then the interpretation cannot be determined. A
violation of this condition is illustrated by the sentence
(22) The day her husband arrived is the day his wife left,
assigned the following phrase marker at SSe
(23)
~§~
COMP S
e
VP
~~NP
N( ~§
/\ /\
DET N COMP S
I
-WH
e her husbandarrived is the day· e The day
I
-WH
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For DETJ. is linked to N~ and N~ contains DET, , so DET,
depends on DETr. • Bu t DET, is 1inked to NPL and NPI con ta ins
DE~ , so DET, depends on DET& • And since dependence is a
transitive relation DET depends on itself and DET depends on
itself.
1.2.3 LF and Conditions on LF
LF is, of course, the crucial component for the empirical
issues pursued in this thesis. Elements of this component are
obtained from elements of SS by a movement rule. The rule, move
-l, is instantiated for English with A. taking the value of the
first noun phrase node dominating Q which is not itself
immediately dominated by another noun phrase node. Now Q is a
kind of determiner. The exact set of Q will be discussed later.
For the time being, I shall consider paradigmatic quantifiers of
English to be "every", "some", "any", and "no".
Tile movement rule substitutes a phrase marker of the form
(3) for a QNP in the phrase marker in question. This QNP is then
adjoined to the S node of the phrase marker: that is, the QNP is
appended to an S node which itself is written abcve the S node of
the marker, An example will make this cldar. In the following
phrase marker of SS,
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(24)
N
I
Cecile
s/'~
COMP S
NP/ ~VP
/ ~NP
V Q/ ~N
I I I
plays every scale
-WH
there is a Q, "every". QR applies to it, adjoining the QNP,
"every scale" to the only node available for adjunction, to yield
the following phrase marker at LF:
(25)
Recall from the discussion in the last section that each
instance of movement creates an instance of linking. This
applies at LF as well as at SSe Thus, the correct representation
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at L~ of (25) must be given as
(26)
e
-WH
sco, ~s
/~~ /s~
N V
I I
every scale Cecil plays e
It is convenient to introduce two terms: "variable" and
"bind". These terms, borrowed from logic on the basis of an
evident analogy, are to be defined in a way which departs from
their recent use by Chomsky.
(27) Definition of variable
y is a variable of x iff (1) x is a QNP,
(2) x has been moved, and (3) y is linked to x.
(28) Definition of binding
x binds y iff (1) Y is a variable of x and
(2) xc-commands y.
In the example above, N~ is a variable, since it is a
variable of the QNP, N~ • Furthermore, N~ binds N~ , since it
c-commands N~ • Given these definitions, one may state, following
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May (1977), the following conditions on LF phrase markers$
(29) Conditions on LF
1. Every QNP binds one variable.
2. Every variable is bound by one QNP.
Notice that if (29) is to be met, QR must apply at least once to
each QNP in a phrase marker.
In the example considered above, (26), the relation of
linking at SS is empty. Consider a case where it is not.
(30)
e every boy obeys
QR applies to yield:
his
,... 46 ~
N
I
mother
(31 )
/8
COMP ~s ____
I / /S ______
-WH P. P /VP~
/ \ v NP
Q N ~N
I I I
e every boy e obeys his mother
It should be obvious that linking at SS, which provides
antecedents for arguments which do not determine their own
referents, couples with linking at LF to furnish the reading for
the sentence,
(32) Every boy obeys his mother,
for which the interpretation is that Billy obeys Billy's mother,
Johnny obeys Johnny's mother ••• Of course, there is also the
interpretation in which every boy obeys just one person's
mother. But this is just the case where DET is not linked at SS
to the QNP. At this point, it should be observed that this
analysis presupposes another condition, not of LF but of semantic
interpretation, namely,
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(33) Condition on Reference
A referring expression gets its reference in one
and only one way.
There is another kind of configuration at LF to be
considered, since it is of singular pertinence to the issues
examined in this thesis: the possible configurations available
at LF for phrase markers at SS with more than one QNP. Here is
an example:
(34)
~§
COMP ~s
N(~VP
/\ /~
Q N V NPl
/""
-WH Q N
I I I
e every man admires some woman
OR has two QNPs to which to apply. Now, whereas in earlier
examples, the phrase marker provides only one site for the
adjunction of the QNP, here, after QR has applied once, thereby
yielding a phrase marker with two S nodes, QR has a choice of two
sites for adjunction (either of the two S nodes) when applied to
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the other QNP. Thus, in terms of (34), if QR applies just to
N~ , then it creates an S node in adjoining to the S node in
(34). When QR applies to N~, it can adjoin N~ to one of two S
nodes, in one case N~ a-commands N~ and in another case NP~
c-commands NP •
•
(35)
eman someevery
s
CO~~S~
/ S
p. p./ ~s
/ \ /'\ /;VP~
Q N Q N V NP
I I I I r
admirese
-WH
(36)
eeman
Q
every
N
womansomee
s/ --------s
COMP ~s
Je------...~ S
~~~VP
/
V
I
admires
-WH
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(Notice that the same pair of phrase markers are obtained even if
QR appl ies to NPl. first and NP, second.)
As one will have undoubtedly observed, the sentence
(37) Every man admires some woman
is ambiguous. On one reading, the sentence asserts that for each
man there is a woman whom the man admires. On another reading,
it asserts there is a woman whom every man admires. The
difference in these two readings, as expressed in terms of logic,
is that in the first reading the quantified noun phrase "some
woman" is within the scope of the quantified noun phrase "every
man" and in the second reading the quantified noun phrase "every
man is within the scope of the quantified noun phrase "some
woman". This ambiguity is implicit in the fact that QR
associates with the phrase marker at SS (34) the pair of phrase
markers at LF, (35) and (36). It is made explicit through
adopting the following hypothesis concerning scope.
(38) Hypothesis Concerning Scope
Let x and y be quantified noun phrases in a
phrase marker at LF. x is in the scope of y
if and only if y a-commands x.
Thus, in (36), ~/here QNPz. "some woman", c-commands QNP, , "every
man", "~lvery man" is in the scope of "some womqn"; but in (35),
..., 50 -
where QNP, ' "every man", a-commands QNPI..' n some woman", "some
woman" is in the scope of "every man". OR, then, can be
understood as the rule that scope must be asigned to QNPs in
sentences of natural language.
It is worthwhile, in concluding this discussion of QR and
LF, to consider one more example, not only as it will illustrate
further the concepts and principles introduced in this section of
the chapter (1.2.3) but also as it will bear out an important
point made in an earlier section (1.1), namely, that a different
and richer explanatory fram~work is made available when the
object of study in linguistics is shifted from acoustic
disturbances which is language to the capacity to use language.
Before considering the next example notice that QR implies
that any simple English sentence with two QNPs will have a pair
of logically inequivalent interpretations when the pairs of
quantifiers are not equivalent under commutation. QR, then,
seems to have some obvious counterexamples. The following
sentence has two quantifiers which do not commute preserving
logical equivalence:
(39) Some oak grew from every acorn.
Its phrase marker at SS is
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(40)
acornfromgrewoaksomee
-WH
~§~
COMP /8~
/
NP VP
'\ /" '"Q N V PP
p/ ~NP
/'"Q N
I I
every
Yet it seems to have only one reading: For every acorn there is
some oak which grew from it. Its phrase marker at LF is
(41)
e9 eweoaksomeacorn
Q
every
-WH
e
_______ S '------
COMP /8~
/8------.
N ~ - sI N Lif ~vP~
V pp
/p
I
from
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The other interpretation of (41) -- namely, there is an oak which
grew from every acorn -- is not available. That is, the
following example is not permitted:
(42)
SCOM~ ~ S _____
I / ______
-WH / p\ s~
Q N s~
N N VP
/~V pp
/p
I
e some oak every acorn e grew from
No doubt (39) is deviant. But is it grammatically deviant?
QR implies thqt it is not. And unlike a linguistic framework
which sets as the object of study mere utterances, the linguistic
framework being worked in here, which takes as its object of
study the humqn capacity to use and understand language, affords
one an alternqtive to the human grammatical capacity (i.e., UG)
as a source of the deviance of (39), namely, the conceptual and
doxic capacities, among others, that ~s, one of the capacities
which, together with UG, interaat to provide each normal human
being with a capacity to use and understand language. The
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evidence that the deviance of (39) is doxic and not grammatical,
is two-fold. First, sentences in every other way like (39) do
have the two kinds of readings ascribed to (39) by (41) and
(42). Consider this sentence:
(43) Some bird flew from every acorn.
It is suited to express the situation in which one bird flew away
from acorn after acorn. And it is also suited to express the
situation in which there are groups of birds around each acorn
and from each acorn one of the birds grouped around it flew
away. Second, the very idea of one oak growing from a collection
of acorns -- as opposed to growing from one acorn in a collection
is contrary to human beliefs of how oaks grow from acorns.
The reading imparted to (39) by (42) is not grammatically
unacceptable, but fact~ally unacceptable.<8>
1.3 Conclusion
This completes the basic exposition of the theory of gramrnqr
underpinning this thesis. Included in this exposition has been
not only a discussion of the broader framework of this theory
(1.1) but also the details of the syntax insofar as they bear on
the task ahead (1.2). In the next two chapters, I shall define,
in terms of their syntax, a class of sentences, and then provide
principles for their semantic interpretation.
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FOOTNOTES-CHAPTER ONE
1. These points are familiar to readers from Chomsky (1965:
Chapter 1), (1968: Chapter 5), (1976: Chapter 1), and
(1980: Chapter 1).
2. Again, these points are familiar to readers from Chomsky
(1968: Chapter 5), (1976: Chapter 2), (1980: Chapter 5),
and especially (1977: Chapter 2).
3. Chomsky (1965: 57-58); and Chomsky (1976: 4-6).
4. For a clear, detailed and elementary presentation of the
topic addressed here, the interested reader should consult
Radford (1981).
5. This section is essentially a synopsis of points adopted
from Higginbotham (1983).
6. By "asymmetric" I mean that if a pair of elements are
realted, the converse pair is not (i.e., if aRb then not
bRa) •
7. This definition of the relation of c-command is adopted
from Reinhart (1976).
8. At the same time, many speakers prefer to assign wider
scope to the quantified noun phrase in the subject position
when both the subject and object contain quantified noun
phrases. Indeed, languages like Mandarin Chinese observe
this as a syntactic constraint (Huang 1982: 4.1.1.4 (59)),
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SYNTAX OF SIMPLE SENTENCES
2.0 Introduction
I shall now undertake to provide an analysis of the
semantics of what I take to be an interesting class of
sentences. There are two important assumptions underlying it.
The first is the usual assumption made in the treatment of the
semantics of natural language, namely, that the analysis be
provided in two stages: the semantic interpretation of a
sentence as a function of its parts qnd the semantic
interpretation of a sentence's most basic parts. The principles
of semantic interpretation governing the former stage are the
recursive semantic pri,nciples and the ones governing the latter
stage are the basic semantic principles. The second assumption
is essential to the methodology of the linguistic framework
adopted here. It is the assumption that the syntactic and
semantic principles of U.G., while autonomous with respect to one
another, nonetheless interact systematically. (See 1.1 above.)
These two assumptions combine to provide the basic hypothesis of
the proposal to be developed now: namely, that the recursive
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semantic principles apply to a phrase marker at LF and that the
basic semantic principles apply to its lexical terminals. It is
intended that the class of sentences examined below is fully
s~mqntically characterized by the recursive principles to be
proposed. But it is not intended that each member of every
lexical category which can appear in the class of sentences to be
examined below is fully semantically characterized by the basi0
semantic principles. Omitted from the purview of the basic
semantic principles are mass nouns. Though the omission of some
lexical categories from treatment means a simplification of the
task undertaken here, nonetheless it does not mean an abjuration
of the implication that the proposal can be extended to subsume
these categories.
I stated above that I shall provide the semantic analysis of
so-called simple sentences. Given the assumption that the
recursive sem~ntic principles apply to the phrase markers of
sentences, I need to define what I mean by "simple st3ntence".
Roughly, a simple sentence consists either in a subject, which is
a simple noun phrase, and a verb in the active voice, which is
intransitive, or in a subject and object, both of which are
simple noun phrases, and a transitive verb in the active voice.
The following sentences are not simple.
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( 1 )
1. The man who would be king is now president.
2. Gandhi did not believe that the English would leave India
willingly.
3. The athelete ran quickly.
4. There's a Jackson in your house.
In more technical terms, a simple sentence is one whose phrase
marker at DS contains at most a simple noun phrase anq a verb
phrase, and the verb phrase contains at most a verb and a simple
noun phrase. (The term "simple noun phrase" will be Qefined
below.) Such sentences are these:
( 2 )
1. Everyone likes Jesse.
2. The qrmy retreated.
3. Jake contemplated the outcome.
The balance of this chapter is devoted to the problem of
providing a syntactic characterization of a simple ~oun phrase.
2.1 The Simple ~oun Phrase: Syntax
Obviously, for the notion of a simple sentence to be of any
use, some definition of the term "simple nOUll phrase" has to be
set out. The structure of the noun phrase has yet to receive its
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definitive treatment, but there is enough expert agreement as to
what any adequate analysis must include to permit me to define
"simple noun phrase". Typically, the noun phrase is subject to
the following phrasal rules:<l>
(3 )
1. NP ----> NP S
{DET }2. NP ----) ( ) (AP) N
NP's
3. Nl? ----) NP CONJ NP
4. N ----) N (PP) (t:P} )
Some of these structures are exemplified below.
(4 )
1 • [IVP [NP the man] [E who sat under the Bodhi tree]]
[IVP [NP the prisoner's] [IV effects]]
[NP [DEr every] [1\7 [ IV g a110n] [ rr of oi 1] [fir from Libya] J ]
[NP [1V,o [41Er the] [N mayor]] [,o"'J and] [/VI' [",P his] [tV wife] 1J
[NP [P£T the] [N [N girl] [PI' from J:parlema] ] ]
2. [Nf [06r the] [~, tall] [tV ships]]
3.
4.
5.
6.
None of these phrases is a simple noun phrase, for a simple noun
phrase is defined to be one which contains no other phrases.
More precisely,
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(5) Definition of a Simple Noun Phrase
A noun phrase is simple if and only if
the NP node dominates no other phrasal nodes
or any S node.
( 6 )
NP
/ ""-DET NI
N
No more than this much phrasal structure is found in these
examples.
(7 )
1. [AlP John]
2 • [,yp (oEr every] (,v man]]
Now there is no mystery about (6), but there is some mystery
about what exactly is encompassed within the lexi.cal cqtegories
of determiner and noun. And it is to this mystery that I turn
presently.
2.1.1 The Syntactic Taxonomy of Determiners
The paradigmatic instances of determiners have been the
articles, definite and indefinite, to use traditional grammatical
~ 60 -
terminology. More recently, determiners have corne to include any
word denoting quantity. In particular, determiners are taken to
include not only words such as a, some, every, each, ~, all,
n2, many, most, few, but also the cardinal numerals. Notice thqt
this implies that the class of determiners is unbounded. In
contrast, I submit that this class is bounded, containing perhaps
not more than a dozen or so items. To see why l propose this,
one needs to consider what kinds of lexical items can, and do,
appear before the noun which is the head of a noun phrase.
According to the phrase structure rule presented above, the
structure of the noun phrase insofar as the head and its
preceding categories are concerned is defined by this rule:
(8 )
NP __--> ( {NPI S}
DET
(AP) N
Now pre-he~d noun phrases are marked by an ~.<2> So, the
problem of ascertaining the extension of the class of determiners
is a matter of ascertaining what those elements are which are not
adjectives yet occur before the noun in a noun phrase which
contains no prenominal NP's. The crucial property is that
determiners do not iterate. It turns out that this property,
applied to phrase markers of the kind stipulated in (8), is
sufficient to disting~ish adjectives from determiners. This
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implies that many lexical items, previously treated as
"quantifiers", are adjectives. This implication may be
considered suspect, if one does not bear in mind the syntactic
and semantic heterogeneity of adjectives. To allay such a
suspicion and to obviate objections to the view of determiners
adopted here, I shall adduce some syntactic and semantic
generalizations about adjectives.<3>
The naive view of adjectives is that they are all like such
adjectives as tall, rich, erroneous, beautiful, etc. What these
have in common is that each can be predicated of a noun in a
simple copulative sentence:
(9 )
1. John is tall.
2. The man is rich.
3. All beliefs are erroneous.
4. This is beautiful.
Such adjectives I shall call "predicative adjectives".
Clearly they attribute qualities to things. But there are many
adjectives which are not predicative, namely cardinal and
thematic ones. Cardinal adjectives are adjectives which say
something about the size of a set. Obviously they include the
cardinal numerals, ~' two, three, Thematic adjectives are
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adjectives which say something about thematic (or case) relations
borne by a thing picked out by the adjective to a thing picked
out by the noun it modifies.<4> Examples are D~ovided in a table
below.
AGENT
PATIENT
BENEFICIARY
INSTRUMENT
LOCATION
MATERIAL
POSSESSOR
POSSESSEE
CAUSE
EFFECT
a presidential lie
an avian sanctuary
a solar generator
marine life
a molecular chain
a musical comedy
reptilian scales
malarial mosquito
thermal stress
Table 1
a lie by a president
a sanctuary for birds
a generator using the
sun
life in the sea
a chain made out of
molecules
a comedy which has
music
scales had by a
reptile
a mosquito which
causes malaria
stress caused by heat.
Notice also that the adjectival noun phrase and its paraphrase by
a prepositionql noun phrase observe similar selection
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restrictions. Thus, a lie requires an animate agent, hence the
oddity both of chemical lies and its paraphrase lies EY
chemicals.
But more important than these semantic properties
characterizing each type of adjective are their syntqctic
properties. Consider this pair of frames:
(10)
1.
2.
DET A N
DET N {
who }
which
is A
(10.1) and (10.2) provide equally acceptable expressions when A
is replaced by a predicative adjective.
( 11 )
1. the tall man: the man who is tall
2. this rich lawyer: the lawyer who is rich
3. some erroneous belief: some belief which is erroneous
A disparity in the acceptability of expressions occurs when A is
replaced by a thematic or cardinal adjective.
( 12 )
1. the five fish: ?the fish which are five
2. the solar generator: *the generator which is solar
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3. a presidential lie: *a lie which is presidential
Second, cardinal and thematic adjectives do not take comparative
and superlative lexical forms: *fiver, *sevenest, *malarialer,
*marinest.<S> Incidentally, thematic and cardinal adjecti.ves do
not take adverbial modifiers of degre~ (e.g., very), whereas some
~
precticative adjectives do. Third, no adjective of one class may
co-ordinate by means of the conjunction and with an adjective of
another.
(13)
1. *five and tall players
2. *handsorne and two friends
3. *malarial and large mosquitoes
4. *rich and criminal lawyers
5. *eight and logical fallacies
6. *musical and three comedies
(14)
1. *five and six politicians
2. *tall and handsome incubus
3. *solar and lunar generator
Fourthly, precticative adjectives iterate with themselves, but
cardinal and thematic adjectives do not.
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(15)
1. a tall pregnant woman
2. *the lunar solar module<6>
3. *these five six attendants
Moreover, when these adjectives iterate with one another, they
observe a definite order: namely, cardinal adjectives precede
predicative adjectives and predicative adjectives precede
thematic ones.
(16)
1. five tall players
2. *handsome two friends
3. large malarial mosquito
4. *malarial large mosquito
5. rich criminal lawyer
6. *criminal rich lawyer
7. eight logical fallacies
8. *logical eight fallacies
9. three, large, ugly, reptilian scales
10. *large, ugly, reptilian, three scales
11. *reptilian, three, large, ugly scales
12. *three, reptilian, large, ugly scales
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Cardinal Predicative Thematic
admits paraphrase
by a relative clause ? yes no
whose verb is to be
--
takes comparative
or superlative forms no some no
takes adverbial
modifiers of degree no some no
iterate with
themselves no yes no
co-ordinate with
an adjective from no no no
another class
linear order 1st 2nd 3rd
Table 2
While the generalizations encapsulated in the table above
hold by and large, there are some noteworthy anomalies. Consider
the four adjectives many, much, few, and little. They have
comparative and superlative forms.
(17)
1. many, more, most
2. much, more, most
3. few, fewer, fewest
4. little, less, least
Yet they do not admit acceptable pairs of expressions in which
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many Americans: *Americans who are many
much gold: *gold which is much
few students: *students who are few
little food: *food which is little.
they are substituted for A in (10.1) and (10.2).
(18)
1.
2.
3.
4.
Moreover, they do not co-ordinate with other predicative
adjectives, or freely iterate with them.
(19)
1. *many and rich bankers
2. *rich and many bankers
3. many rich bankers
4. *rich many bankers
Now it might be thought that many and few are cardinal
adjectives, for, like the cardinal numerals, they indicate the
size of the set denoted by the noun they modify. But unlike the
other cardinal numbers, these do not co-ordinate with them or
with each other.
(20)
l~ *many and few diplomats
2. *two and many capsules
3. *few and three tablets
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4. *four and five policemen
Another candidate for the class of cardinal adjectives is
several. But it too fails to co-ordinate with other cardinals,
or even those which were just discussed.
(21)
1. *several and three enzymes
2. *two and several soldiers
3. *many and several professors
4. *several and few lakes
Yet several precedes both predicative and thematic adjectives.
(22)
1. several friendly customers
2. *friendly several customers
3. several national banks
4. *national several banks
Ttlese anomalous adjectives, I shall call "qlJasi-cc\rdinals".
Having completed this sketch of some 8f the syntactic and
semantic properties of aQjectives, I return now to the problem of
delineating the class of determiners. Like any ill-understood
category, the de,terminer has served as a repository for words
which seem to be entangled in a web of idiosyncratic properties.
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The paradigmatic cases of determiners have been the articles,
definite and indefinite -- to use terms from traditional
grammar. As I said before, determiners have come to include any
word denoting quantity, and in particular, to include the
cardinal numerals.<7> This implies the class of quantifiers, and
hence the class of determiners is infinite. In contrast, I hold
the class of determiners to be made up of three lexical
categories: demonstratives (OEM), which include what have
traditionally been called "demonstrative adjectives";
interrogatives (INT), which includes the i.nterrogative adjectives
of traditional grammar; and quantifiers (Q). The lexical items
in each category are listed in the following table.<8>
DEM singular a the this that
plural the these those
INT singular which what
plural which what
Q singular a,some each, any, every no
plural some all no
Table 3
Excluded from this table are the cardinal numbers and the
quasi-cardinals many, few, most and several.
What justifies their exclusion from the class of
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determiners? Determiners cannot be iterated with one another.
This is borne out by the facts set out below.<9>
DEM OEM: *that a car DEM DEM: 'A' a that car
OEM INT: *this which tie INT DEM: *which this tie
DEM Q *the each election Q DEM: *each the election
INT OEM: *What the friends OEM INT: *the what friends
INT INT: *which what lawyer INT INT: *what which lawyer
INT Q *what some guard Q INT: *some what guard
Q DEM: *some these cat·s DEM Q *these some cars
Q INT: *no which Qor,t~ivance INT Q *which no contrivance
Q Q *any no essay Q Q *no any essay
Table 4
In contrast, almost any determiner may precede a cardinal or
quasi-cardinal ~djective.
DEM CARD:
(
the Jthis
that
Ol.e book
{
the } {two }these three
those four
books
{
the } {many }these few books
those several
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INT CARD:
Q CARD:
( \'/h iCh} one bookwhat
{WhiCh] {two J visitorswhat . three
t:~;~h} {~:~y }suppl ies
several
*a
some
*each
*every one lamp
any
no
{some} {f ~ ve Iall SlXno seven
{some} {manY }*all fewno several
proposals
errors
Table 5
Moreover, no cardinal or quasi~cardinal may precede any
determiners.
CARD DEM: {the J*ooe is book
that
{*two } tthe J*three se friends
*four those
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fman
y I{the }*few these lots
*several those
CARD INT: *one {WhiCh} writer
what
I*two I {WhiCh} docks
*nine what
rmqny } {WhiCh}
*few what bombings
*several
CARD Q: a
some
each
*one every container
any
no
rfive } {~~me}*six reflections*seven all
{*many t {some}*few no*several all stamps
Table 6
Now a view which maintains that cardir,als and
quasi-cardinals are quantifiers, and hence determiners, is
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committed to q rather strange anomaly: these would-be
quantifiers are the only ones which may iterate with the other
quantifiers and determiners, but they may iterate only once and
may r~dver precede the other quantifiers and determiners. On the
view here, there is no anomaly: the facts of ordering result
from the syntax of the noun phrase and the traditional lexical
categories, both facts being independently grounded.<lO> There is
another fact which militates in favor of this view: it is
precisely the cardinals and quasi-cardinals which, if treated as
quantifiers, fail to exhibit the scopal relations demanded by QR.
2.1.2 The Syntactic Taxonomy of Nouns
There are three disjoint categories of nouns: proper names,
pronouns, and cornmon nouns. Common nouns themselves fall into
two disjoint categories, count nouns and mass nouns. Examples
are these:
Proper ~ames:
Pronouns
Common Nouns:
Count Nouns
Mass Nouns
Harry, Poona, the Ghats, the Hague, .•.
this, whom, what, I, himself, each other,
bottle, friend, proposal, thinker, .•.
gold, bread, experience, oats, news, ..•
Table 7
Proper names and pronouns do not occur with determiners, but
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common nouns may. Proper names and mass nouns do not admit the
contrast between sing~lar and plural. This classification is
represented in the following matrix.
occurs with a
determiner
Proper ~ame
Pronoun
admits the contrast of
singular and plural
+
Mass Noun
Count Noun
+
+
Table 8
+
To sustain the plausibility of this classification, one must
bear in mind two facts. First, lexical rules, which map lexical
entries into lexical entries, need not alter every co~ordinate of
an entry which is the pre~imqge of an application of a rule. In
particular, a lexical rule need not alter the phonological
co-o~dinate of an entry. Second, the morphology of a lexical
item in a surface sentence is not a simple projection of the
item's associated syntactic features.
I shall elaborate on this latter fact before I undertake to
show how these facts bear on the problem of the syntactic
taxonomy of nouns. To say that the morphology of lexical items
in a surface sentence is not a simple projection of the items'
associated syntactic features is to say that it is not the case
that for each syntactic feature there is a unique morphological
realization and that each morphological realization of a
syntactic feature is a unique realization. That is to say, the
denial is the denial of any bijection between the set of
syntactic features and some subset of the morphological
realizations of these features. However, to assert this denial
is not to assert that there is no systematic il.teraction.
Indeed, there is. It is a fact about the syntactic component of
grammar that different lexical items admit of different syntactic
features. In the situation at hand, it is a fact of tlAe
syntactic component that pronouns and count nouns admit the
syntactic features of plurality and singularity (i.e., +PL and
-PL), but that proper names and mass nouns do not. At the same
time, it is a fact of the morphological component of grammar that
each word must be inflected. Now, English inflectional
morphology is impoverished: except for pronouns, English nouns
are inflected only with (morphological) number: the inflection
for morphological singular is phonetically null and the
inflection for morphological plural is phonetically realized as s
or as ablaut, idiosyncratic cases aside (e.g., medium, media).
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The result of these facts is that those nouns which admit
the contrast in syntactlc features ~PL or +PL have those features
realized in terms of the phonetically appropriate morphological
singular and plural, but also nouns which do not admit the
contrast in these syntactic features must acquire either singular
or plural morp~ology. It is this requirement of the morphology
which accounts for the facts that some proper names may be
morphologically singular (e.g., Harry, The Hague) but other
morphologically plural (e.g., The Andes); and that some mass
nouns may be morp~ologically singular (e.g., gold, experienc~)
and others may be morphologically plural (e.g., oats, news). At
the same time, lexical rules map proper names and mass nouns into
count nouns often with a concomitant shift in meaning. As a
result, one encounters such expressions as the Jake, this he,
breads, Parises, etc. This is evidenced by these sentences.
(23)
1. The Jake I know is not the Jake you know.
2. This he refers to someone other than whom that he refers
to.
3. How many breads does this bakery carry?
4. Are there any Parises in New York State?
Note that if a mass noun is assigned singular morphology, its
correspondent, if any, among the count nouns acquires the
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appropriate morphological singular or plural, depending on the
lexical item's syntactic feature of +PL or -PL. But, if the mass
noun is assigned plural morphology, its correspondent, if any,
among the count nouns will not be able to assimilate a further
morphological contrast (e.g., oats).
Having established the basic syntactic lexical categories
pertaining to nouns, one might observe the following about the
size of the cQtegories: while ther& is no bound, or at least no
clear bound, on the size of the categories of proper name and
common noun, there is a clear bound on the category of pronoun.
Indeed, one can easily list them, as is done here.
ENGLISH PRONOUNS<ll>
Demonstrative -PL something, someone this that
Pronouns +PL some these those
Personal 1st -PL I me my mine
Pronouns +PL we us our ours
2nd -PL you you your yours
+PL you you your yours
3rd -PL he him his his
she her her hers
it it its
tPL they them their theirs
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Interrogative -PL who,whom which what
+PL who,whom which what
Quantifying -PL someone each everyone anyone none
Pronounds Bornath i'11g everything anything nothing
+PL some all none
Pronominals -PL he him his his
she her her hers
it it its
+PL they them their their
Trace t
Relative -PL who,whom,whose which what
Pronouns +PL who,whom,whose which what
Reflexive -PL myself yourself himself,herself,
Pronouns itself
+PL ourselves I themselvesyourselves
Reciprocal each other, one another
Pronouns
Table 9
2 • 1. 3 Syn tact i c Fea t\~ res and the Nourl Phrase
Above, when the notion of syntactic feature was first
broached, it was raised in connection with noun~ and their
syntactic singularity and plurality. In languages where there is
agreement betweAn the head of a noun phrase and its specifiers,
the question arises as to how the agreement is to be achieved. I
suggest these assumptions.
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(24)
1. Every lexical item acquires a maximally consistent set of
syntactic features chosen from among the ones it admits.
This is vacuously borne out in the case of lexical items which
admit of no syntactic features. Where lexical items do get
syntactic features, (24.1) guarantees that there is no failure to
assign a syntactic feature in some category. Thus, for example,
if English adjectives ware inflected for gender, (24.1) would
insure that exactly one syntactic feature of gender be assigned.
Some English noun admit of the syntactic features of number
(+PL), so (24.1) insures that exactly one of the two features be
assigned.
Moreover, I suggest these:
(24)
2. If X is the head of a phrase XP, then the set
of syntactic features assigned to X are assigned
to XP.
3. If Y is a determiner in a phrase XP, then the syntactic
features of Yare consistent with i the syntactic
features of XP.
They combi'1e to account for the following distribution of
acceptability of noun phrases .
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this table
*these table
that dart
*those dart
*this tables
these tables
*that darts
those darts
each
every
any
*all
friend
*each
*every
*any
all
Table 10
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friends
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER TWO
1. These rules were suggested by Jim McCloskey in lectures
given in his classes at MIT in the fall of 1983.
2. The view I adopt here is that personal pronouns undergo q
systematic phonetic shift (to possessive personal pronouns)
in the environment's. (See the third column under the
entry for personal pronouns in Table 9 in 2.1.2 below.)
For the sake of expository ease, I treated possessive
personal pronouns as deteriners in the first chapter.
3. The account here is based on the work of Levi (1978). Levi
(1978) studies the systematic ~ontrast between thematic and
predicative adjectives, called by her "non-predicating" and
"predicating" respectively.
4. Sensitivity to this distinction can be found in Aristotle's
Categories (Chapters land 8: la12ff and lOa27ff).
5. This is not to say that there cannot be homophones of these
adjectives which do, or could, permit these forms; but sl~~h
an adjective is derived from its homophone by a lexical
rule. This is borne out by the fact that a shift in
meaning. Thus, for example, some predicative adjectives do
not admit comparative and superlative forms: *squarer,
*sguarest. When such forms do occur, there is a shift in
meaning; in particular, the quality denoted becomes one
which admits of intensification. For example, squarer
means something like more closely resembling ~ ideal
sguare.
6. Both Sylvain Bromberger and Noam Chomsky have brought to my
attention such acceptable combinations as: royal marine
biologist, musical lunar module.
7. See: Jackendoff (1977: Chapter 5), May (1977), and
others.
8. The reason for the double occurrence of a will be brought
out in 3.1.1 below.
9. There is only one apparent exception: all the men, all
those men, all these men. But, as I shall show, all
permits the elision of of in partitive constructions. (See
5.1 below.) There is also, of course, the idiom eve~y
- 82 -
which way. It was brought to my attention by Sylvain
Bromberger and Jeff Pelletier.
10. Of course, there is the option of treating cardinal
numerals and quasi-cardinal numerals as being both
adjectives and determiners.
11. This table is not complete. It is here for the reader's
convenience and to convey the idea of just how many items
are encompassed in this categoryo
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SEMANTICS OF LEXICAL ITEMS
3.0 Introduction
I seated at the outset of the last chapter that two crucial
assumptions are at work here. First, I assumed that the
principles of syntax and those of semantics are to be stated in
independen~~ terms, though these principles interact in systematic
ways. Second, I assumed that the principles of semantic
interpretation apply in a recursive fashion to categories and
structures provided by the syntactic principles. As I indicated
before, the phrase markers at LF provide the structure to which
the recursive semantic principles apply and the lexical items,
which are the terminals of these phrase markers, provide the
elements to which the basic semantic principles apply. In the
next chapter, I shall state and illustrate the recursive semantic
principles; in this chapter, I shall state only the basic
semantic principles. Since the task is to &tate the principles
of interpretation for simple sentences, in stating the principles
interpreting lexical items I shall confine my attention to I ~e
(syntactic) lexical categories which enter into simple
sentences: the determiner, the noun, and the verb. The
- 84 ~
interpretation of some of tre lexical items within each of these
categorie$ will be explored below.
3.1 Determiners Interpreted
Although the dete~'miner is not a unified semanti~ category,
each of its three subcategories -- the demonstrative, th~
interrogative, and the quantifier -~ is. I shall leave jt for
another occasion to treat the semantica of interrogatives,
instead I shall concentrate my attention on the semantics of
demonstratives and quantifiers, in that order. The problem of
stating their semao,tics i~' complex; to sj,mplify, r shall give
only a pre~iminary account here, leaving some questions open,
pdnding further developments in the rest of this chapter.
3.1.1 Demonstratives Interpreted
As is well-known, demonstratives depend on the situation of
their utterance for their complete inte~pretation~ That is to
say, the same demonstrative uttered in the same sentence, but in
different circumptances, can have a different reference. Th~
question naturally arises: what part of the interpretation of a
demonstrative results from its lexical meaning and \'hat part from
the cit'cumstances of its utterance? This question Joust be
addressed, if a satisfacto4y charact~rization of the lexical
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semantics of demonstratives is to be provided. And to answer
this question, one must furnish an analysis, at least in broad
outline, of the pragmatic and semantic facts, insofar as they
impinge on the interpretat~on of demonstratives. So although the
problem here is that of the semantic interpretation of
demonstratives, nonetheles~ I must provide an analysis of those
aspects of pragmatics which bear on the interpretation of
demonstratives.
Essentially, a aemOllstrative, when used felicitously,
supplies the addressee of the utterance in which it occurs with
enough information so that the addressee, through that
information and through his knowledge of the context, can settle
on the denotat~on of the noun phrase, which is among the
denotation of the head noun. The informatiun provided through
the utterance of the demonstrative call be modulated by
paralinguistic means, for example, by pointing or nodding. This
modulation, in effect, reduces the oize of t~e context of
utterance. In fact, just what has been said so far describes the
deictic use of the definite article. The demonstrative
adjectives this and that differ from the defi,nite article insofar
as the information provided by one is that the denotation of the
noun phrase is near whereas that provided by the other is that
ti"f! denotation is not near.
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The foregoing needs to be made more precise. To that end,
let me introduce the no~ion of a canonical situation of utterance
- -
(Lyons 1~77: 637ff.). It is the situation taken to be embodied in
typical occasions of utterance. There are one or more
partic~pants, one of whom is the utterer, the remainder of whom
are addressees. The participants 8hare a perceptible environment
which includes a phonic medillm for the vocal-auditory channel of
the utterer. The utterer himself, at the moment of utterance, is
at the origin of a spatiotemporal co-ordinate grid from which
distance is measured. Although the canonical situation of
utterance must involve much more than this, the description just
given is sufficient to provide the definition of certain
features, namely, the features +OEICTIC and the features
+PROXIMATE. To be deictic is to he locatable in the situation of
utterance by any of the participants in it. To be proximate is
to be near the origin of the situation of utterance. These two
properties, defined in terms of the canonical situation of
utterance, are defined for any given situation of utterance
insofar as the canonical situation is realized. Demonstratives
have some of these features as part of their lexical meaning; but
how these properties or relations, which interprete lexical
features, fare 'on any given occasion of utterance, depends on ho",
the canonical situation oe utterance is instantiated.
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How, then, are demonstratives to be interpreted? As a first
step in the answer to this question, it is convenient to
decompose the lexical entry of a demonstrative into semantic
features. The definite article, the, has only one feature:
+DEICTIC. The demonstrative adjective, this, has two: +DEICTIC,
+PROXIMATEi and the demonstrative adjective, that, also has two:
+DEICTIC, -PROXIMATE. The semantic interpretation of
demonstratives is a Boolean function of the functions assigned to
each feature. Tte functions assigned to the features have
subsets of the domain of interpretation as their domains and
subsets of objects in the situation of utterance as their
ranges. As it will turn out, the interpretation of a
demonstrative is essentially that of an adjective, except the
range of the function assigned to a demonstrative is subsets of
the objects in the situation of utterance, whereas the range of
the function assigned to an adjective is subsets of the domain of
interpretation. I shall defer further specification of the
nature of such functions until a later chapter where I discuss
the interpretation of adjectives (See 5.2.1 below).
I should point out that the things which can be deictic or
proximate need not be restricted to physical things in the
situation of utterance. The on-going utterance itself can be
deictic and, as the utterance stretches over time, parts of it
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can be more or les5 proximate to the origin of the situation of
utterance. To see this, consider someone going through a proof
by reductio ad absurdum. Arriving at the next to the last step,
he says, referring to the previous thing expressed: but this
claim is false. Moreover, objects and events can be considered
deictic and proximate (or not) insofar as the utterance which
expresses them are deictic and proximate (or not). For example,
having just expressed some fact, one can refer to it by saying
"this fact is of fundamental significance."
The decomposition of the demonstratives into features
suggests the question: is there a demonstrative which has the
feature -DEICTIC? I believe there is; it is the indefinite
article ~, which has no phonetically reali~ed plural form. And,
I believe, it is this indefinite article and its phonetic~lly
null plural form which account for so-called specific readings of
the indefinite article and many cases of so-called bare plurals.
The plausibility of the former view is suggested by the fact that
the specific interpretation of a has resisted successful
treatment as a quantifier (Ioup 1977). And indeed, this view has
confirmation in recent research.<l> Assuming, then, that it is
correct, the question of a phonetically null plural form of the
indefinite article is re-opened. Greg Carlson (1977) ha~ argued
for the view that there is no such plural counterpart, but his
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argument was based on the assumption that the indefinite article
is a quantifier in all its occurrences.
3.1.2 Quantifiers Interpreted
Some prime number is even
Every prime number greater than two is odd
No prime number greater than two is even3.
Let me turn from the interpretation of demonstratives to
that of quantifiers. It is generally agreed that the quantifiers
of natural language are properly represented by restricted
quantifiers. Restricted quantifiers, first introduced by Rosser
(1953), and developed by Hailperin (1957), are a departure from
the syntax of first order predicate logic. It was thought that
their use would permit a closer correspondence between the
parlance of mathematics &nd the formulae of logic. Thus,
sentences like the ones in (1) were not thought to be properly
paralleled by the formulae in (2):
(1 )
1.
(2 )
1. 3x (Px " Ex)
2. Vx (Px A x>2 -~-> Ox)
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3. 'Ix (Px 1\ x>2) ---;, nEx)
(where "E" means "even", "C,h Ineans "odd", and up" means "prime
number"). It was thought that just as the quantifiers in (1) are
restrict~d to the domain circumscribed by the nouns in the
subject, ~o the quantifier in the formula should be restricted to
the domain circumscribed by logical predicates. To this end, the
syntax of first order predicate logic was modified so as to
permit open sentences in the quantifiers, and these open
sentences restricted the domain of quantification of th~
quantifier to that part of the domain of interpretation
satisfying the open sentence. The sentences of (1), then, are
formulated in the syntax of restricted quantification as
follows<2>:
(3 )
1. (]x: Px) Ex
2. (Vx: Px A x>2) Ox
3. (Vx: Px" x>2) .,Ex.
To see how this alteration in the syntax of first 0rder
predicate logic is handled by the semantics, recall that
quantifiers in first order logic can be interpreted as two-place
functions. The first place of the function takes its values in
the domain of i.nterpretation and the second place takes its
values in the set of n~plaoe propositional funcrtions (i.e., the
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n-place functions which are assigned to n-plaae predicates,
taking n-tuples of individuals in the domain of interpretation
and yielding one of the Boolean values fO,l}). And the range of
the function assigned to the quantifier is the set of (n~l)-place
propositional functions. Now when restricted quantifiers are
permitted by the syntax, the values which the first place of the
quantificational function takes are in a subset of the domain,
namely, the one whose members satisfy the predicate in the
res~ricted quantifier.
It was first suggested by Staal (1960), I believo, that the
logical form of quantified noun phrases is that of a restricted
quantifier. This has now become the general view. Typically,
the function interpreting a quantifier in natural langua0e takes
values in a subset of the domain. This subset is furnished by
the denotation of the balance of the noun phrqse in which the
quantifier occurs. It takes as its other value the propositional
function which interprets the verb to which the quantified noun
phrase is an argument. But this account fails to provide for the
fact that quantifiers admit the syntactic feature +PL. With this
shortcoming in mind, I suggest th6 following modification of the
interpretation of quantifiers.
(4) Principle of Interpretation of Quantifiers
Let D be a domain of individuuls. The power set of D
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is the domain of interpretation. Let Q be a
quantifier. QO is a two-place function. Its first place
takes values in a subset of the domain of interpretation;
its second place takes values in the set of n-place
generalized propositional functions (i.e., n-place
functions which take as values n-tuples of subsets
of the domain and which yield as values one of the
Booleqn values {O,ll). QO yields values in the
set of (n-l)-place generalized propositional function$
The grounds for this approach to quantification in natural
language will become clear when the interpretation of simple
sentences themselves is addressed in the ndxt chapter. (See 4.3
below.)
3.2 Nouns Interpreted
As was pointed out previously, nouns are of four kinds:
proper names, pronouns, and common nouns which are either mass or
count. I shall not treat here the principles of semantic
interpretation pertaining to mass nouns.<3> Instead, I shall
attend solely to those pertaining to proper names, pronouns, and
count nouns.
3.2.1 Count Nouns and Proper Names Interpreted
The basic principle is this:
(5) Principle of Interpretation of (non-mass) Nouns
Let D be the domain of individuals. The power set
of D is the domain of interpretation
1. It N is a proper name, then its interpretation in
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Dis a membe r 0 f D (i. e ., N 0 aD) ;
2. If N is a pronoun or count noun, then its
interpretation in D is a. subset of D (i.e., NO~D),
namely, its extension in D.
3.2.2 Pronouns Interpreted<4>
The foregoitlg encapsulates al,l that is germane to the
semantic inte~pretation of proper names and count nouns. This is
because all the information required for interpretation is
encoded into their lexical entries. However, more needs to be
said about pronouns: in addition to what is specified in their
lexical entries, some of them require syntactic relations to
other items in the same sentence to finally be interpreted, and
others of them require conditions definable in terms of the
situation of utterance to be met to finally be interpreted.
Pronominals, trace, reflexive, reciprocal, and relative pronouns
depenQ on their syntactic relations for interpretation;
demonstrative and personql pronouns depend on the situation of
utterance for interpretation; and quantifying and inte~rogative
pronouns are fully interpretable through their lexical entries.
Let me begin my discussion of the principles governing the
semantic interpretation of pronouns by setting forth those
perta ining to anaphor 10 pronouns. By'" anaphor i c pronouns", I
mean pronominals, trace, reflexive, reciprocal, and relative
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pronouns. In referring to these as anaphoric pronouns, I depart
somewhat from current usage and hark back to traditional usage.
This term is used here to character'ize semantically a subset at a
syntactic class; that is, this term is used to refer to that
subset of pronouns (a syntactic category) whose semantic
interpretation depends on links they have with other elements in
the sentences in which they occur.
The interpretation of anaphoric pronouns depends on the
relatiun of antecedence, which is defined over phrase markers at
58 and is modulated by certain general conditions. (See 1.2.2
above.) There, unlike here, no distinction is made between third
person personal pronouns and pronominals. Under the syntactic
taxonomy implicit there, it is necessary to stipulate that on any
given use of the third person personal pronoun, only one of the
principles of semantic interpretation applies. (See (33) of
1.2.3 above.) That is, one needs to pre-empt a personal prLooun
from being given an interpretation through deixis and through its
antecedent. However, under the syntactic taxonomy adopted now,
no such stipulation is necessary since there is only one
principle to apply to any given lexical item. In light of this
re01assification, it will prove useful to restate the syntactic
conditions on the relation of antecedence.
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Recall that the relation of antecedence is the transitive
closure of the relation of linking. (See (16) of 1.1.2 above.)
Linking, one will remember, is a bInary relation, which is
asymmetric, and hence, also irreflexive. Nodes on a phrase
marker are linked in accordance with the following.
(6) Rule of Linking
Every instance of movement assigns a link from the node
from which there is movement to the node to which there
is movement.
Thus the set of links on a phrase marker is augmented with each
instance of movement. But anaphoric elements must be provided
with an antecedent; and linking is the available device whereby
one is provided. 80, in addition, phrase markers at SS must meet
the following condition:
(7 )
Every anaphoric element whose immediately
dominating noun phrase node is unlinked is to be
lirlked to another noun phrase node.
This linking at 88 is subject to three more conditions.
(8 )
1. No anaphor a-commands its arltecedent.
2. The syntqctic features of an anaphor and its antecedent
agree.<S>
3. No anaphor depends on itself.
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Cases of sentences violating these conditions are provided
below:
(9 )
, .
Finally, note that sentences like (9.1) to (9.3) can never be
gramrnat ical, for in each case thet'€ is no nOl.ln phrase node to
which the noun phrase node of t~e anaphor can be properly
linked. (9.1) has a counterpart which is grammatical: it is the
sentence just like (9.1) except that it has a third person
personal pronoun instead of a pronominal; in that event the third
person personal pronoun is interpreted through deixis.
The anaphors of trace, relative pronouns, reflexive
pronouns, and reciprocal pronouns are subject to a strengthened
version of (8.1), namely,
(10) The antecedent of a trace, relative, reflexive, or reciprooal
pronoun c-commands it.
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This condition is known to hold for trace: a phrase never moves
to a position which does not a-command its trace. It is also
clear that it holds for relative pronouns from the very structure
of relative clauses. This is illustrated below:
(11)
NP
/
NP
/ ""',
DET N
s
/
COMP
I
NP
I
-WH
s
Moreover, under all current analyses of the eXlraposition of
relative clauses, the antecedent still a-commands the WH phrase
(Chomsky 1981: 56, n. 39).
In connection with this discussion of conditions on
anaphors, it is appropriate to mention a lexical idiosyncracy of
reciprocal pronouns: they always have the syntactic feature of
+PL. This lexic~l fact of reciprocal pronouns combines with
(8.2) above to yield an account of the following distribution of
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·grammatical and ungrammatical sentences.
(12)
1. *Eliza saw each other.
2. The women saw each other.
Nor should this distribution be viewed as a matter of common
sense, (that is, a non-grammatical matter) for collective nouns,
nouns which denote collections of objects, are never antecedents
of reciprocal pronouns, unless they bear the syntactic feature
+PL.
(13)
1. *The army shot at each other.
2. *The swarm flew after one another.
And this understanding is further favored by the fact that even
those count nouns whose morphology precludes the morphological
realization uf the contrast between the syntactic features of +PL
or -PL are clearly interpreted as referring to a set whose
cardinality is greater than one, when the noun phrases containing
them are the antecedent of a recip~ocal pronoun (Flango and
Lasnik 1973: 452).<6>
(14) The binoculars are focussed differently from each other.
Having set forth the syntactic conditions on the basis of
which anaphoric elements come to acquire their denotation, one
can now state the very simple principle governing th~ir semantic
interpretation: An anaphor is assigned the same denotation as
its antecedent. More formally,
(15) The Principle of Interpretation for Anaphors:
Let 0 be a domain of individuals. Let the power
set of 0 be the Qomain of interpretation. Let A
be an anaphor and NP be its antecedent. Then
AD ~ NpD •
The reader should bear in mind that the reciprocal pronoun has a
still further condition imposed through its lexical entries.
This will be explored in detail later. (See 4,3.2 below.)
Having completed this presentation of lexical interpretation
of anaphors, I now turn to that of demonstrative and personal
pronouns. It is generally held that the interpretation of
demonstrative and personal pronouns depend, not wholly, but
nonetheless to a great extent, on the situation of their
utterance. And indeed, reverting to the notion of the canonical
situation of utterance and using the device of features assigned
to a lexical entry, one can provide an analysis of the lexioal
interpretation of these pronouns. The following table of
correspondences between demonstrative pronouns and simple noun
phrases which contain demonstratives as determiners provides the
clues as to how the analysis should go in the case of
demonstrative pronouns.
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Simple Noun Phrases
whose DET's are OEM's
this one
these ones
that one
those ones
the one
the ones
some one (thing); a one
some ones (things)
Table 10
Demonstrative
Pronouns
this
these
that
those
"''If'"
***
someone (thing)
some
It seem~, then, that demonstrative pronouns have, in their
lexic~l entries, the (semantic) features which their
corresponding demonstratives have, thereby determining properties
defined within the situation of utterance, and that they are
assigned sets, in accordance with the fact that they are nouns,
whose extension is that of their lexically assigned semantic
features insofar as these features a~e realized in the situation
of their utterance. Hence, !hi! (these) is assigned the set of
objects in the situation of utterance which are locatable within
the situation of utterance (i.e., deictic) and are near (i.e.,
proximate). That (those) is assigned the objects in the
situation of utterance whose objects are locatable within the
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situation of utterance (i.e., deictic) and need not be near
(i.e., not proximate). Finally, ~ (~) is assigned a set of
objects which may not be locatable within the situation of
utterance (i.e" not deictic).<7~
The personal pronouns too can be analy~ed in terms of
semant~c features defined over the canonical situation of
utterance and whose extension is determined on any given occasion
of utterance as a result of the realization of the canonical
situation. The first person personal pronoun is assigned the
singleton which contains the utterer<8> and the second personal
pronoun is assigned the set which contains the addressees. The
third person personal pronouns have different features, namely,
GENDER and DEIXIS. In a sense, these pronouns fill the gap in
the paradigm of the demonstrative pronouns where there is no
demonstrative pronoun corresponding to the simple noun phrase
whose determiner is the definite article. (See Table 10 in 2.1.2
above.) That the third person personal pronoun may be deictic is
clear. It is easy to see that the situation of utterance
determines the reference of the pronouns as used below.
(16)
1. I wonder where he is off to?
2. I am glad he's gone.
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One can see that by suitably changing the situation of their
utterance, the third person personal pronoun will find a
denotation or will not; and if it does find a denotation, it can
vary from situation of utterance to situation of utterance. It
is also clear that the fact that these pronouns are marked for
gender provides furthe~ information for the determination of
denotation. Finally, it is obvious that through suitable
paralinguistic modulation of their utterance (i.e., through
nodding or pointing) their denotation may be isolated in a
situation of utterance in which the pronoun would otherwis~ fail
to have its lexically specified features satisfied.
I pointed out, in connection with my treatment of
demonstratives, that the utterance itself forms part of the
situation of utterance and objects or events can come to be
deictic in virtue of the utterance which denotes them. It is
this phenomenon which accounts for cases of so~called discourse
anaphora. And it is the fact that both preceding utterances as
well as preceding part$ of an utterance are part of the situation
of utterance which permits so~called discourse anaphora to
obtrude into sentences. And this fact furnishes the basis for an
important observation due to Evans (1980).
He points out that sentences like the following permit the
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free interchange of the quantifiers~ and n2.
(17)
1. Some congressman admires only the people he knows.
2. No congressman admires only the people he knows$
But, he notes (1980: 340), other sentences do not.
(18)
1, Some congressman admires Kennedy and he is very junior.
2. *No congressman admires Kennedy and he is very junior.
As it turns out, the sentential structure embodied in the first
pair permits a referential dependence by the (anaphoric) pronoun
on the noun ph~ase which is the subject of the sentence; and the
sentential structure embodied in the second pair does not permit
such referential dependence. The fact that the third person
personal pronoun in (18.1) may indeed denote what is posited by
the subject of the first part of the sentence, accrues, not from
any referential dependence, but from deixis: the first part of
the utterance, which forms pa~t of the situation of utterance,
posits. (through the assertion of a complete sentence) the
existence of some congressman, and it is in virtue of the
utterance of the phrase, which, in the first independent clause
uttered, posits some congressw~n, that the deixis of the third
person personal pronoun succeeds. In contrast, the utterance of
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t(18.2) does not lead to the positing of any such individual which
can be singled out by the subsequent use of the deixis of the
third person personal pronoun. To be sure, this is not an
idiosyncracy of the quantifier £2; it is a fact about what is
asserted. Thus, consider tnis sentenC6.
(19) Some congressman does not admire Kennedy,
and he is very junior.
The deixis of the pronoun succeeds only when the quantifier has
wider scope than the adverb not. To verify this, compare (19) to
a gloss where the negative adverb is given wide scope with
respect to the first independent clause.
(20) It is not the case that some congressman admires Kennedy,
and he is very junior.
Once again, the utterance o~ the first independent clause posits
no entity ~or deixis by the personal pronoun.
From personal pronouns, I turn to quantifying and
inte~rogat~ve pronouns. As I said earlier, the semantics of
inte~rogative pronouns will not be treated in this toasts, so I
need only concentrate here on the lexical interpretation of
quantifying pronouns. As with demonstrative pronouns, so with
quantifying pronouns, their counterparte among the determiners
provide clues as to their lexical interpretation.
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Simple Noun Phrases
whose DET's are Q's
some one (thing)
some ones (things)
anyone (thing)
everyone (thing)
each one (thing)
all things
no one (thing)
no ones (things)
Table 11
Quantifying
Pronouns
someone (thing)
some
any; anyone (thing)
everyone (thing)
each
all
none (nothing)
none
Quantifying pronouns are construed as quantifying functions, just
like quantifiers, except that the value assigned to the first
value of the function associated with the quantifier is lexically
determined. In the unmarked case, its values are in a set of
subsets of the objects in the domain of discourse; and in the
marked cases, its values are in a set of subsets of objects 1n
the domain of discourse which are regarded as animate, indeed
human (someone, ~nyone, everyone) or its value is the set of
objects which are regarded as non-human (something, anything,
everything).
3.3 Verbs Interpreted
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In turning to the interpretation of verbs, I must address an
issue which I have so far managed to avoid: do lexical items
have an argument-structure? If so, which lexical items? And if
a lexical item has an argurnent~structure, how is it to be
represented in its lexical entry? And what is the relation
between argument~structure and positions in a phrase marker? Any
general treatment of the sentences of natural language must come
to grips with all these questions. Some of these questions will
· be addressed in a more general fashion in a later chapter, (see
5.2.2 below) at least to the extent that the generalization of
results in this chapter require it. In this chapter, I shall
confine myself to treating the issue only to the extent as is
required by the results aimed at in it.
Now, within the linguistic framework of this thesis, it is
generally thought that verbs have argument-structure. This is
taken to mean that the lexical entry of a verb has an n-tuple,
each co~ordinate of which corresponds to an argument~place of the
verb. In additi0o, I shall assume that each verb must have
exactly one distinguished argument-place; the remaining
argument-places are undistinguished.<9> Intransitive verbs have
one argument-place; transitive verbs have two. By way of
illustration, one could think of a lexical entry's specification
of argument to appear as follows:
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(21)
row (1*)
~
hit (1*,2)
Since a verb is to be assessed with respect to the noun
phrases which are its subject and object, one must ask how the
argument~places in the argument-structure of the verb are to be
mapped into a phrase marker. To this end, I propose to define
two relations over phrase markers.
(22) Definition of an External Argument Position<lO>
Let X and ~ be nodes in a phrase marker, and
in particular, let Y be a lexical category (yo).
X is an external argument position of Y if and
only if (i) Y has a maximal projection M(Y~),
(1i) M(y9) and X a-command each other, and
(iii) no other node dominating X a-commands M(Y~).
Definition of an Internal Argument Position<lO>
Let X and Y be nodes in a phrase marker, and
in particular, let Y be a lexical category (yO).
X is an internal argument position of Y iff (i) X
is a maximal projection and (i1) X and Y a-command
each other.
On the basis of these definitions, a function whiah maps
argument~places onto argument-positions can be defined.
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(23) The Assignment of Argument-Places to
Argument-Positions.
Suppose A is a lexical item with n argument-places
and a (l~i$n) are its associated argument-places.
If a is undistingu~shed, then i.t is assigned to
the internal argument-position with respect to the
node which immediately dominates A; if a is a
distinguished argument-place, then it is assigned
to the external argument-position with respect to
the node which immediately dominates A.
To see how these definitions work, let me set out a simple
exarnple.<ll>
(24)
NP:S~VP
I /~
N V N~
, I I
Shim hit N
I
Sham
The external argument-position of the node V is the node N~ ,
since the maximal projection of the node V, namely the node VP,
a-commands, and is a-commanded by N~ , and no other node
dominating NP, a-commands VP. The internal argunl\;)nt-position of
the node V is the node NPL , since NPl. is a maximal projection,
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and the nodes V and NP~ a-command each other. If, then, hit is
assigned to the node dominated by V, its distinguished argument
is assigned to N~ and its undistinguished to NP~.
Given the syntax of the argument-structure of verbs and
given how the argument-places in the structure is assigned to
argument-pos~tions in a phrase marker, one can formulate a
semantic principle of lexical interpretation for a verb. A verb
is to be interpreted as a "generalized propositional function".
A generali~ed propositional function is simply a generalization
of a propositional function familiar from first order predicate
logic. To see what is meant by generalized propositional
function, recall that n-place predicates of first order logic are
interpreted qS n-place (propositional) functions from n~tuples of
individuals ~n the domain of interpretation into the Boolean
values {O,ll. A generalized propositional function is an n-place
function from n-tuples of sets of individuals in the domain of
interpretation into the Boole~n values {O,ll.<12>
(25) ~rinciple of Interpretation for Verbs
Let D be a domain of individuals. Let the power
set of 0 be the domain of interpretation. Let V
be a verb with n argument-places. Then vP is
an n-place generalized prepositional function
into the Boolean values {O,I) (1) which
is defined over n~tuples of subsets of 0, and
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(2) whose ith place corresponds to the ith
argument-place of V.
Thus, ~ is assigned a one-place function from subsets of the
domain of interpretation into Boolean values [O,l} and the
argument~place of ~ corresponds with the argument-place of its
function. Hit is assigned a two-place function from pairs of
subsets of the domain of interpretation into Boolean values, the
first argument-place of the verb corresponds to the first
argument-place of the funotion, t=lnd the seCOOQ argulflent.:~~place of
the verb cor~esponds to the second argument-place of the
function.
3.4 Conclusion
The task wh.i.cl'l I undertook in the second cha1)tatf anl1 1. shall
bring to a close in the next is the statement of the semantic
principles of interpretation for simple sentences~ The second
chapter gave the syntactic analysis of simple sentences and this
chapter gives the semantic principles of interpretation which
apply to some of the lexical items in the lexical categories of
determiner (namely, quantifiers and demonstratives), noun
(namely, count nouns and proper names), and verb.
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FOOTNOTES ~ CHAPTER THREE
1. Subsequent to the initial draft of this chapter, Peter
Ludlow brought to my attention the article by Fodor and Sag
(1982), which allOWS exactly tt•. is pc,int: the indefinite
article has both a quantificational intdrpretation, to be
rep~esented by a quantifier, and a referential
interpretation, to be represented as a demonstrative.
2. It i~ w~ll-known that for the quantifiers discussed here,
the formulae in (3) can be defined in terms of those in
(1 ) •
3. For an overview of the problem, see: Pelletier and
Schubert (1984).
4, There are a number of approaches to the syntax and
semantics of these items within the linguistic framework
adopted in this thesis. For disQussion of this point, see
Bouchard (1982). I have selected an approach conducive to
my expository ends.
5. As Noam Chomsky pointed out to me, this condition must be
refined to handle anaphors with split antecedents. (For
example, in the sentence "Michael told Martlla that they
shoul,(l get married", "Mictlael" und "Martha" are both
anteoedents of "they".)
6. Among such nouns are tllose which Jespersen (1909: Part Ii,
Sect. 7) calls "composite objects". Typically, these nOL.ns
denote objects made up of two similar parts. Examples
include: trousers, pants, g!aese!I and binoculars.
7~ Though! shall not do so here, it is easy to provide the
interpretation of demonstrative pronouns on the basis of
the interpretation of their corresponding demonstrative
adjective and the lexical rule connecting demonstrative
adjectives with pronouns.
8. Notice that the first person personal pronoun, when plural,
is assigned the appropriate non~singleton which includes
the spaaker.
9. The view here is a modifioation of that of Williams
(1981). For a detailed exposition of this modification see
Gillon (work in progress).
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10. The maximal projection of a verb node is the first phrase
node dom~nating it; and the maximal projection of a noun
node is the first noun phrase node dominating it. M(V)-
VP and M(N) ~ NP.
11. The S node has been omitted here and in subsequent phrase
markers as its incl~sion is a needless complication.
12. The reason for the use of generali~ed propositional
functions in the interpretation of verbs will be made clear
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER f'OUR
THE SEMANTICS OF SIMPLE SENTENCES
4,0 Introduction
The task broached in the second chapter, namely, the
interpretation of simple sentences, can be brought to a close.
The principles introduced in the preceding two chapters and
principles to be introduced below converge. As it happens, the
point of convergence is the interaction of the interpretation of
verbal structures (verbs or verb phrases) with the interpretation
of nominal ones (noun phrases). To stave off unnecessary
complication, I shall first address the recursive principles of
inte~pretation which can be stated in relative isolation: the
principle of interpretatiun for semantically vacuous branches of
a phrase marker (at LF) and the principJe of interpretation for
simple noun phrases. Next I shall turn to the fact that plural
noun phrases are liable to so-called "collective" and
"distributive" readings. In particular, I shall address tIle
question of the division of labor between the semantic component
of the grammatical capacity and the conceptual and doxic
capacities insofar as such readings are concerned. As it turns
out, a proper division of labor, together with the principles of
interpretation urged here, provides a straightforward and natural.
account of these readings. This is shown in the discussion which
brings this chapter to culmination: nam~ ly, the discussion of
the treatment of the interpretation of simple sentences, in which
is incorporated the treatment of the interpretation of the verb
phrase as well. Finally, I turn to a bonus of the semantic
principles argu&d for in these chapters: a simple treatment of
the interpretation of simple reciprocal sentences (i.e., simple
sentences with reciprocal pronouns), a treatment which seemed out
of reach in light of the facts adduced by Langendoen (1978).
4.1.1 Miscellaneous Points ~ Interpretation
A number of preliminary points should be attended to. The
most general is the point pertaining to semantically vacuous
nodes. Such a configuration is where one node immediately
dominates another but does not immediately dominate any other.
This is illustrated below:
( 1 )
x
I
'{
What one wants to say in such cases is that the interpretation
assigned to the dominating node (X) is the same as the one
assigned to the dominated node (Y),
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(2) Principle of Interpretation for Vacuous Nodes
Let D be the domain of interpretation. Let X be
a node which dominates exactly one other node Y.
Then XC ~ yo.
Another point concerns the semantic treatment of the
syntactic features +PL and ~PL assigned to the NP node. The next
principle is addressed to that end.
(3) ~rinciple of Interpretation of Syntactic Features
Let D be a domain of individuals whose power set is the
domain of interpretation. Let NP be a noun phrase node.
1. If NP is assigned the syntactic feature -PL,
then INpDI ~ 1;
2. If NP is assigned the syntactic feature +PL,
then INpol > 1.<1>
This principle needs supplementation by a convention which
relates a member of the domain of interpretation with a subset of
the domain containing just that member. To state it, though, I
need a few terms. Let me distinguish non-empty sets into two
sorts: singletons, which have exactly one member, and
non~singletons, which have more than one member. On the basis of
this distinction, one can discern three disjoint classes of
sets: the empty set, singleton, and non-singletons. Following
Higginbotham (1981), I adopt the convention that singletons are
to be identified with their members.<2>
~ 116 ~
(4) Convention for the Interpretation of Noun Phrases
In a semantic interpretation, a singleton
and its member (e.g., {xl and x) are equivalent.
4.1.2 Simdle Noun Phrases Interpreted
Obviously, every simple noun phrase must have a noun. But
simple noun phrases need not have determiners. Where the noun is
a pronoun or a proper name, it cannot have a determiner. Where
the noun is a common noun, it need not have a determiner, or so
it appears in at least some cases. I said earlier that I shall
not be addressing the semantics of mass nouns; and I warn here
that I shall not be pursuing the semantics of so~called bare
plurals. The cases of simple noun phrases to be considered,
then, are either structures with just a proper name or a pronoun,
or structures with a determiner and a count noun. The latter
structures are of three kinds: demonstrative with a count noun,
quantifier with a count noun, and interrogative with a co~nt
noun.
I shall begin my discussion of the interpretation of simple
noun phrases by considering those which contain either a mere
pronoun or a mere proper name. Every such case has the following
structure (where L is a proper name or a pronoun)
(5 )
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NP
I
~
I
L
Now the principle in (4) (in 3.2.1 above) provides the
interpretation of L. And principle (2) above provides the
interpretation of N, namely that NO ~ LO , and in turn of NP,
namely that NpP = NO, In short, (4) (of 3.2.1 above) and (2)
combine to yield the result that Npo = LO.
I now turn to the cases involving count nouns and
determiners. Since interrogatives are not to be dealt with here,
there remains only the cases of quant~fiers and demonstratives
with count nouns. Some of the analysis required must await
further development of the ideas pertaining to the
predicate~argument structure of lexical items. What ~emains to
be said at this point follows from earlier remarks on the
semantic principles governing quantifiers and demonstratives and
the syntactic principles pertaining to syntactic features. I
shall assume that syntactic features are assigned freely to all
lexical items which admit them, In the case of the simple noun
phrase, this means that syntactical features, in particular,
those of singularity and plurality (i.e" +PL and -PL), are
freely assigned to count nouns, demonstratives, and quantifiers.
Furthermore, the syntactic features of the noun are qssigned to
the noun phrase node itself. (See (24.1) of 2.1.3 above.) The
specifiers, in this case, demonstratives and quantifiers, which
in fact do admit features, must match those of the projaction of
the head to which they are specifiers. (See (24.3) of 2.1.3
above.) In this case, the assumption means that the features
(syntactic) of demonstratives and quantifiers must mqtch those of
the noun phrase node, which receives its features from its head.
At this point, it is useful to ~eturn to some points made
earlier (in 4.1.1 above) about syntactic features. To begin
with, though, recall that proper names do not occur in simple
noun phrases with determiners. (See Table 8 in 2.1.2 above,)
So, in a simple noun phrase the noun phrase node does not branch
and does not oominate any other node which branches. Hence, by
the principle in (2) above, the interpretation of the noun phrase
node dominating a proper name is the same as the interpretation
of a proper name, namely, an individual. But remember that from
the point of view of semantic interpretation, an individual and
the singleton set containing it are equivalent. Therefore, the
cardinality of the noun phrase node dominating the proper name is
one. (See (4) in 4.1.1 above.)
Another important point to underscore is that simple noun
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phrases containing singular count nouns must have a denotation
whose cardinality is one. This requirement, stated in (1.1)
above, applies even if the count noun in question is,
conceptually speaking, plural. Such a class of nouns are the
collective nouns (Jespe~sen 1909: Part II, Sect. 4.8). It
includes such words as: forest, army, swarm, library, train.
Forest picks out a collection of trees, army a collection of
soldiers, swarm a collection of insects (of one kind), library a
collection of books (as opposed to a building housing them), and
train a collection of cars. Each of them admits the contrast of
singular and plural (i.e., -PL and +PL).
4.2. Collective and Distributive Readings
This last issue is absolutely central to the semantics of
even simple sentences. I shall consider it here only insofar qS
it pertains to the semantics of simple sentences. Here, the
issue surfaces as the problem of how collective and distributive
readings of sentences qre to be treated. What is the difference
between collective and distributive readings? Let me begin with
an example of a sentence clearly susceptible to each of these
readings.
(6) The men rowed.
It is read distributively, if the action of rowing is taken to
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hold of each man denoted by "the men"; it is read collectively,
if the action holds of the men taken as a collection. To see
this more clearly, imagine that "the men" denotes Rick and
Randy. Suppose that Rick was in one boat and rowed, while Randy
was in another and rowed. Surely (6) can be used to express this
fact. In such a case, ~ holds of Rick and Randy
distributively. In contrast, suppose that Rick and Randy were in
one boat, each pulling on one of two oars. This situation too is
expressed by (6). But this time row holds of Rick and Randy
collectively. It does not take much imagination to see that
collective and distributive readings can get pretty complicated
fast. As the next sentence can be true, even if no one servant
is involved in carrying anyone box all the way home.<3>
(7) The servants carried the boxes home.
Confronted with such data, one seems to have two options.
One can decide that the data does not bear on the grammatical
capacity at all. The semantic principles make available one
interpretation, and further construal results from other
considerations, including conceptual and doxic ones. Or, one can
decide that the grammar provides each and every reading. The
correct analysis is, I believe, to be had from both. The
semantics provides all the collective and distributive readings;
the conceptual system provides objects of interpretation and the
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doxic system provides what sort of properties or relations hold
of what sort of objects. The interaction of these systems
account, at least in part, for judgments of acceptability of
sentences liable to collective and distributive readings~ (See
1.1 above.) Evidence for this comes from several sources, Let
me discuss them each in turn.
First, it is ~vident that it is the human conceptual and
doxic capacities, and not the human grammatical capacity, which
are responsible for regarding certain sentences as odd. That is,
one might be tempted ta regard the oddity of the following
sentence as a grammatical fact. (See Krach 1974: Ch.5, Sect.
5.0.)
(8) ~he soldier surrounded the town.
Regarding it as ungramamtical, one might naturally suggest that
surround subcategorizes for a plural feature on the sUbject noun
phrase. This conjecture receives some support from sentences
like the following:
(9) The soldiers surrounded the town.
But such a conjecture is belied by the fact that the verb in
question goes well with singular noun phrases for subjects where
the noun phrase contains a collective noun.
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(10)
1. The army surroundeQ the town.
2. The swarm of bees surrounded the town.
One might think, in response to these examples, that the
restriction on the subject noun phrase is not syntacti~ but
semantic, requiring a selection restriction instead, perhaps that
the subject noun phrase denote a collective object. But this
revision too runs afoul of the facts.<4>
(11)
1. The river surrounded the town.
2. The amoeba surrounded the paramecium.
Indeed, is (8) truly odd, let alone ungrammatical? What if
there were a man whose height exceeded the circumference of a
town? What about an ad~lt of normal height and a town which is a
miniature model? Consider (8) in light of the following
scenario. A soldier is home on leave. He has given his child a
toy, a miniature town. He is playing with his child and in doing
so has manqged to encircle the miniature town with his body
(perhaps hiding it from the child). Would not (8) express this
situation? The oddity of (8), when felt, accrues not from a
violqtion of the rules of the grammatical capacity, but from a
failure of the conceptual system to dream up, without some
prompting, suitable objects. Compare
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(12) The hand surrounded the coin.
Second, it is evident that the human conceptual capacity is
responsible for finding suitable objects for the semantic
interpretation. This is already implied by the discussion in the
previous paragraph. But it is also implied by the semantic
principles adopted in the earlier part of this chapter. Recall
the principle that noun phrases which have the syntactic features
of +PL or -PL are interpreted as singletons, if they have the
feature -PL, and as non-singletons, if they have the feature
+PL. Collective nouns, it was observed, admit these features,
hence singular collective phrases are to be interpreted as
singletons. The semantics is thereby committted to collective
objects. Given that this step has been taken, one has no reason
to baulk at bringing collective readings of plural noun phrases
under the same rubric.
The strength of the foregoing consideration is only as
strong as the plausibility of the view that collective objects
are the product of the conceptual capacity, and not the
grammatical capacity. The evidence is that, in general, it is
hard to see how one can deny that the task of determining an
object is a conceptual one. The negative evidence is that the
determination of a collective object depends crucially on all
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kinds of extra-grammatical factors, such as knowledge of the
wo~id and its customs. Consider an army. It is a large
organized body of men armed and trained for war and destined
chiefly for land service. Do these same men constitute an army
onGe the organization has broken down? Probably not. But is
ascertainin~ such a fact part of the grammatical capacity's
task? I don't see how. Note that these kinds of problems about
collective objects have their analogue with non-collective ones.
Consider a car. It is certainly an individual (as opposed to a
collective) object. Now, imagine that it has been disassembled
completely and its parts are arranged in order of size on the
floor of a garage. Does the individual object, a car, still
exist? Maybe it does and maybe it does not; but surely the
grammatical capacity does not decide that!
Let me draw out further the connection between denotation of
singular collective nouns and the denotation of plural nouns read
collectively.<5> Reflect upon this sentence.
(13) The soldiers saw the Indians.
Let "the soldiers" denote the soldiers of F troop and let "the
Indians" denote a band of renegade Indians. Now, consider this
sentence in light of two scenarios. In the first, the soldiers
of F troop are out tracking the band which is fleeing to Mexico.
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The soldie~s are properly d~ployed and the soldier riding point
spots the Indian riding rear guard, none of the other soldiers
being able to see any of the Indians and the soldier riding point
not being able to see any of the other Indians. So here, one
soldier sees one Indian, yet it seems fair to say the soldiers
saw the Indians. In the second scenario, the soldiers of F~ troop
are allan furlough and each has gone his separate way. The
Indians of the band are each roaming the plains separately. Now
the same soldier as before just happens to catch a glimpse of the
same Indian as before. Surely in such a case the assertion of
(13) is inappropriate. Now, these same judgments, I think, hold
of the next sentence considared in the light of the same pair of
scenarios.
(14) The troop of soldiers saw the band of Indians.
Third, I want to show that the human doxic capacity is
responsible for ascertaining when properties, usually thought to
be true only of individual objects, are true of collective
objects. This point can be raised with regard to the preceding
pair of sentences. But let me, instead, pick a new pair.
(15)
l. The man is left-handed.
2. The men are left~handed.
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Left-handedness is a property of human bodies. This fact might
mislead one into thinking that (15.2) has only one reading, a
distributive one, and that the grammar must guarantee that (15.2)
has only one reading. But does it have only one reading? Could
it not have a collective reading? One might baulk at such a
suggestion on the grounds that it is odd to speak of a collective
object aR having the property of left-handedness. But if that
were so, then, under the assumptions adopted so far, there would
be no accounting for the unimpeachability of this sentence:
(16) The team is left-handed.
So the view adopted here is that plural count nouns are
liable to an array of collective and distributive readings, that
the conceptual capacity provides both collective and individual
objects for semantic interpretation, that the doxic capacity
provides the means of construing properties and relations which
hold paradigmatically of individual objects as properties and
relations which hold of collections of such individual objects,
and finally that the speaker's knowledge of the worlQ is
responsible for making some readings of plural noun phrases more
salient than others. Because of the importance of this view, let
me illustrate it further with a number of examples whose import
will not be brought to bear until later in the chapter •
•
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Usually, the relation of knowing (in the sense of being
personally familiar with) obtains between pairs of individual
persons. Thus, there is nothing odd about this sentence.
(17) The American knows the Russian.
At the same time, though, it is perfectly consistent to say that
(18) The American team knows the Russian team.
But surely the American team would be said to know the Russian
team because at least one member of the American team, insofar as
he is a member of the team, knows at least one member of the
Russian team, also insofar as he is a member of the Russian team;
for one would be loathe to admit the logical compatibility of
(18) with the following example:
(19) No member of the American team knows any member of
the Russian team.
However, it should not be concluded from this that every relation
ascribed to collective objects is based on some relation between
individuals in the collective objects; for the next pair of
sentences fail to have the incompatibility of the pair of (18)
and (19).
(20)
l~ The American team endorses the Russian team.
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2. No member of the American team endorses any member of the
Russian team.
Indeed, there is no logical incompatibility between (20,1) and
this sentence.
(21) No member of the American team endorses the Russian team.
That is, no member of the American team would endorse the Russian
team, though the American team, as a collective body, does.
As a final example, let me adduce some sentences whose main
verb is displace. Displace, in the sense of one thing taking the
place of another, is believed to be a relation between individual
objects. Moreover, it seems to be not only an entrenched common
sellse belief that two (distinct) things cannot occupy the same
place at the same time, but a belief sanctioned by physics.
Hence, when one hears the sentence
(22) The boy displaced the girl.
one believes that the space occupied by the girl comes to be
occupied by the boy -- the girl going to a different location.
In addition, it is hard to believe that one displaces two girls,
seated, say, ten meters apart, for no one believes a boy (or
anything of a suitable size) can occupy two places (of suitable
si~e and distance apart) at the same time. And yet, it is
perfectly grammatical, both syntactically and semantically, to
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say:
(23) The boy displaced the girls.
Indeed, imagine the situation in which there are several girls
and one boy. Each child has a seat, and there are only enough to
go around. The teacher for these children orders the boy to take
another seat, thereby having to deprive some girl of her seat.
And if, further, each girl displaces the one next to her, until
eventually the boy's vacated seat is occupied, then, under these
circumstances, it is perfectly appropriate to say (23). In terms
of one's beliefs about the real world, only one child displaces
another. But the boy did not displace the girls one by one;
rather, he displaced one girl who was so related to others that
her displacement caused their displacement. In other words, the
5U:r1s can be read collectively and the relation taken to hold
between the boy and the girls insofar as the relation holds
between the boy and one girl.
4.3 Simple Sentences Interpreted
Since the interpretation of the verb phrase is essentially
like that of the simple sentence, I now turn directly to the
~nterpretation of simple sentences. In light of the limitations,
adopted earlier in the thesis, on which items are to be treated
in the lexical categories of determiner and noun, there are
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basically four cases to be considered: those which arise
depending on whether the noun phrases are quantified or not, and
those which arise depending on whether the verb is transitive or
not. Cases of noun phrases without quantifiers are simpler than
those with; and case of sentences with intransitive verbs are
simpler than those with transitive ones. So the discussion below
will proceed as follows: (i) a sentence with an intransitive
verb and no quantified noun phrase, (ii) a sentence with a
transitive verb and no quantified noun phrases, (iii) a sentence
with an intransitive verb and a quantified noun phrase, and (iv)
a sentence with a transitive verb and quantified noun phrases.
Intimately bound up with the interpretation of (simple)
sentences is the problem of the provenience of collective and
distributive readings of (simple) noun phrases. For this reason,
I broach this problem at the outset of the treatment of the
simplest case, a sentence with an intransitive verb and no
quantified noun phrase. Consider this pair of examples.
(24)
1. The man rowed.
2. The men rowed.
It is clear that (24.1) can be handled by an interpretation in
which the man is assigned an individual from the domain of
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interpretation and row is assigned a one-place propositional
function. Even if one adopts the principle for interpreting
nouns given earlier, in which nouns are assigned subsets of the
domain of inte~pretation, one can still assign ~ a
propositional function, since the convention was adopted that
singletons, which are assigned to singular nouns, are equivalent
in semantic interpretation to their members. But such a move is
not possible in (24.2); and it is for this reason that
generalized propositional functions are defined over subsets of
the domain of interpretation (not over individuals). (See (4) in
3.3 above.)
But generalized propositional functions also permit a
natural and straightforward treatment of the problem of
collective and dist~ibutive readings. To see this, one should
consider an interpretation of (24.2) in some detail. Let the ~
denote a set, say
(25) {Rick, Randy, Rod]
Now, consider these situations.
(26)
1. Rick, Randy, and Rod were in one boat and rowed, each
pulling an oar.
2. Rick and Randy were in one boat and rowed, each pulling an
oar; while Rod was in another boat and rowed.
~ 132 ~
3. Rick and Rod were in one boat and rowed, each pulling on an
oar; while RanQY was. in another boat and rowed.
4. Randy and Rod were in one boat and rowed, each pulling on
an oar; while Rick was in another boat and rowed.
5. Rick was in one boat and rowed; Randy was in another boat
and rowed; and Rod was in still another boat and rowed.
It is clear that each situation in (26) makes (24.2) true. Note
that (26.1) and (26.5) correspond to the collective and
distributive readings of (24.2) respectively. But note also that
(26.2) through (26.4) are other readings which fall between the
collective and distributive ones. In a sense which is to be made
rigorous, (26.1) and (26.5) are bounds on the readings of
(24.2). To show that in this case, associate with each of the
situations in (26) a family of sets, each member being the set of
people in a boat of the given situation. That is to say, the
following families of subsets of the set denoted by the ~ are
respectively associated with each situation in (26).
(27 )
1. {{Rick, Randy, F,od 11
2, {{Rick, Randy J, {Rod J J
3. {{Rick, Rod 1, {Randy 11
4. { [Randy, Rod J, [Rick}}
5. 1{Rick 1, {Randy 1, {Rod 11
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Careful consideration of (24.2) reveals that (26) does not
provide one with all its readings. Surely, (24.2) is true in the
following situation.
(28) Rick and Randy were in one boat and rowed,
each pulling on an oar; and later Rick and Rod were
in one boat and rowed, each pulling on an oar.
Here the associated set is this family:
(29)
1. {{Rick, Randy}, {Rick, Rodl I.
Indeed, situqtions like (28) corresponding to each of the
families of sets below can be seen to make (24.2) true.
2. {[Rick, Rod}, [Randy, Rodl}
3. {[Rick, Randy}, [Rod, Randy}}
4. [{Rick, Rod}, {Rick, Randy}, [Randy, RodlJ
Now, each member of each family in (27) and (29) is a subset
of the set consisting in Rick, Randy, and Rod (i.e., of (25)
above). But the families of (27) and (29)) are not all of the
families of subsets tram (25). For example, there is this
family:
(30) [{Rick, Randy, Rodl, {~ick, Randy}}
Given such a set, could one conceive of a reading of (24.2) such
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as the following?
(31) Rick, Randy, and Rod are in one boat
and rowed, each pulling on an oar; while later
Rick and Randy were in one boat and rowed, each
pulling on an oar.
But this is not a reading. To see this, suppose that it were.
If only the situation of (26.1) obtained, then (24.2) would be
false on the reading associated with (30). But this is not so.
It seems then that once a sentence like (24.2) is true in virtue
of a situation like (26.1), then it remains true no matter how
the situation is enriched. Thus, subsets of (25) in addition to
(25) itself to a family of sets are superfluous in the
interpretation of (24.2). So, which families of subsets of (25)
are the ones which provide the subsets of the domain of
interpretation whereby (24.2) could be true?
The answer to this question requires the introduction of
some technical terminology. First, there is the term "cover". A
cover of a set is any family of non-empty subsets of the set to
be covered each of whose elements, when taken together,
constitute the set to be covered.<6> This can be stated more
precisely.
(32) Definition of Cover
Let Y be a set. Let P(¥) be the power set of Y.
X, a subset of P(Y), covers Y if and only if
(1) U X = 'l and (2) %iix.
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The families in (27) and (29) each cover (25). And so do the
families in (30) and the following:
(33)
1. {{Rick, Rod, Randy}, [Rick, Rod}, [Rick}}
2. {{Rick, Rod, Randy}, {Rick}, {Rod}, {Randy)l
A special kind of cover (i.e., a set which covers another set) is
a partition. It is a cover none of whose members have any
elements in cornman.
(34) Definition of Partition
Let Y be a set and P(Y) the power set of Y.
X, a subset of P(Y), is a partition of Y if
and only if (1) X covers Yand (2) for all distinct
pairs in x, x and y, x n Y ~ o.
The famjlies in (27) are partitions of (25). Now, the families
pertinent to semantic interpretation are what I shall call
"plurality covers". A plurality cover is a cover none of whose
members are subsets of any of the others.
(35) Definition oe Plurality ~over
Let Y be q set and P(Y) be the power set of Y.
X, a subset of P(Y), is a plurality cover of Y
if and only if (1) X covers Yand (2) for all distinct
pa i rs in X, x and y, x * y •
The only plurality covers of (25) are those in (27) and (29). In
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fact, the set of plurality covers of a set is a superset of the
set of its partitions and a subset of the set of its covers.
The set of plurality covers of a given set embody a certain
amount of structure which it is important to note in the present
context. In particular, the set of plurality covers of a given
set can be partially ordered, having within that order a maximal
and a minimal element. Now a partial ordering relation is a
relation which is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. The
relation which partially orders the set of plurality covers is
the relation borne by one plurality cover to another when every
member of the former plurality cover is a subset of some member
of the latter plurality cover. I make this precise as follows:
(36) Definition of Subplurality Cover
Let Y be a set. Let PC, (Y) and PC~ (Y) be plurality
covers of Y. PC, (Y) is a subplurality cover of
PC l (Y) if and only if for all xe PC, (Y) there is some
yt PCt(Y) such that x is a subset of y.
Below is the partially ordered set diagram of the set of
plurality covers of a set consisting of three distinct elements.
(Compare (25) above and the sets in (27) and (29),)
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{ {a,b}
{ {a,b,c} J
{b,a}, {a,e} J
{ [a,e} , {a,b} J { {a,b} , {b,e} } { {a,c} , [b,a} }
[ {a,b] , [e} } [ [a,e} , [bJ 1 { {b,e} , {all
[ tal , {bl , {el
Figure 1
To see that the relation of being a subplurality cover is a
pqrtial ordering, one must see that it is reflexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive. And it is to this task that I now
turn. It is obvious that the relation is both reflexive and
transitive, so I shall only set out a proof that it is
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antisymmetric as well. If one plurality cover is a subplurality
cover of another plurality cover and the second is a subplurality
cover of the first, then the plurality covers are the r~me: in
other words, the relation of being a subplurality cover is
antisymmetric. Suppose that X and Yare subplurality covers of
each other, but they are distinct. Then, because X ; Y, there is
some member; of X, say x, ' which is distinct from every member of
Y. But x, is a subset of some set in Y., say Y, , since X is a
subplurality cover of Y. Therefore x, is a proper subset of Y, •
But ~ is a subset of some set in X. This set cannot be x" since
x, is a proper subset of Y,. So let this set be x l. ·' But X, is a
subset of x~, since x, is a subset of Y, and Y, is a subset of
Xl- But then X would not be a plurality cover, sirlee it contains
two distinct sets, x, and Xl' such that one (X,) is a subset of
the other (~t). The relation of being a subplurality cover is,
therefore, antisymmetric. And so, I have shown that the relation
is a partial order.
Finally, I wish to show that the plurality cover of a set
which contains just the set !tself is the maximal element of all
the plurality covers of the set, and that the plurality cover
which contains just singletons of each element member of the set
covered is the minimal element of all the plurality covers of the
set covered. Now, an element is a maximal element in a set of
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partially ordered elements just in case ev~ry element in the
partially ordered set bears the partial ordering relation to it~
It should be clear that every plurality cover of a set X is a
subplurality cover of the plurality cover [Xl, for the members of
any plurality cover of X are each subsets of X. Hence, for any
Dlurality cover of X, every member of that plurality cover is a
subset of X, hence that plurality cover is a subplurality cover
of {X}. So {X} is a maximal plurality cover of X. Next, consider
the family which consists in all the singletons for each member
of X. Call such a family Y. Y is a plurality cover of X and Y is
a subplurality cover of every plurality cover of x. ~or let Z be
a plurality cover of X, and let {yJ be a member of Y. If, {yl is
not a subset of any member of Z, then it is not a subset of the
union of all the members of Z. In that case, y is not a member of
such a union. But then the union does not cover X, since y is a
member of X but not a member of the union of the elements of Z.
Hence, Z does not cover X. But Z is a plurality cover of X. So
the supposition that [y) is not a subset of any member of Z is
false. Hence, Y is a subplurality cover of every plurality cover
of X, and so is the minimal plurality cover in the set of
plurality covers (of X).
To sum up, then, one should observe that the set of
plurality covers of a given set is a partially ordered set under
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the relation of being a subplurality cover, whose greatest
element is the plurality cover containing just the given set and
whose least element is the plurality cover containing all and
only the singletons of each element in the given set.
I began this section considering the collective and
distributive readings of a simple sentence with an intransitive
verb. Let me now consider one with a transitive verb.
(37) ~he men endorsed the women.
Suppose the men denotes Rick and Randy and the women denotes
Diane and Lillian. Below are given the plurality coverings of
the two doubletons, and below them, eight directed bipartite
graphs are given, each depicting one of the readings of (37),
(38)
[{Rick, Randy]}
[ [Rick 1, {Randy 1J
w, [{Diane, Lillianll
[[Diane), [Lillianll
1. {Rick, Randy} ~ [Diane, Lillian}
2. {Rick, Randy}
-=:::::::::::; {Diane}[Lillian}
3. [Rick}
{Randy} , {Diane, Lillianl
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4. [Rick} ... [Diane}
{Randy} ". [Lillian}
5. {Rick] [Diane}
(Randy} [Lillian}
6, {Rick} {Diane}
{Randy} {Lillian}
7, {Rick] [Diane}
{Randy} [Lillian}
8, {Rick} [Diane}
{Randy} [Lillian!
In general, then, how many readings (i.e., distinct ways to be
true) are there for a simple sentence with a transitive verb?
Let n be the number of plurality covers of the subject noun
phrase and let M (1 ~ i i n) be one of its plurality covers.
Let n be the number of plurality covers of the object noun phrase
and let W (1 ~ j ~ m) be one of its plurality covers. Then the
total number of readings is the sum of the number of bipartite
directed graphs from members of Mi to members of ~ such that
each member of Mi has a directed arc to some member of ~ and
each member of ~ has a directed arc to it from some member inJ
M,. ,
I now come to the cases of simple sentences with quantified
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(simple) noun phrases. Naturally, I begin with the case where
the verb is intransitive. Examples of such a case are given
below.
(39)
1. Some man rowed.
2. Each man rowed.
3. Some men rowed.
4. All men rowed.
To see how these sentences are to be interpreted, one needs to
know the form of the phrase marker at LF, how the principles of
interpretation apply to the phrase marker (in particular, the
principles of interpretation for quantifiers), and what import
the singularity or plurality of the noun phrase has (in
particular, what import they have for the quantifiers in the noun
phrases in which they occur).
I shall address each of these points in turn. First, there
is the matter of the phrase marker at LF. One saw in the first
chapter that phrase markers at LF are derived, in the non-trivial
case, from phrase markers at SS by the rule OR. Now the phrase
marker of each sentence in (39) at SS is identical to its phrase
marker at OS. I give the phrase markers of all the sentences in
(39) at SS as one below:
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(40)
/s~
N~ VP
/\ I
DET N, V
I
N
each
some
all
man
men
rowed
QR triggered by the quantifier in NP of (40) generates the
following phrase markers at LF for the sentences in (39).
(41)
s
DET
some
each
all
N,
I
N
I
man
men
e
s~
VP
I
V
I
rowed
Recall that QR is a movement rule and movement creates links. In
these cases, NPI. is linked to NP, • So NP, binds NPI. and NP'I, and
N~ have the same features. In (39.1) and (39,2), NP has the
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tfeature -PL; but in (39.3) and (39.4), NP has the feature +PL.
Second, I maintained in chapter three that quantifiers are
interpreted as two-place functions. The first place of the
function (QD) takes values in the power set of the domain of
interpretation; the second place of the function (Qo) takes
values in the set of n~place generalized propositional functions;
and 0° yields values in the set of 0-1 place propositional
functions. More specifically, the first place of 0° takes as
values any plurality cover of the set which is the extension of
the balance of the noun phrase in which it occurs. In a simple
noun phrase the values are any plurality cover of ND • If the
quantified noun phrase has the feature -PL, the plurality cover
is the minimal one, that is, the one which consists in singletons
of the members of the set covered. If the quantified noun phrase
has the feature +PL, then the plurality cover is anyone which
does not contain a singleton member. The upshot, then, is that
the NP node of a quantified noun phrase is interpreted as a
one-place function mapping n-place generalized propositional
tunctions into n-1 place generali~ed propositional functions.
This function, QNpo, takes the generalized propositional function
assigned to its sister S node as a value.<7>
The foregoing Cqn be applied to the sentences in (39) in
terms of the~r phrase markers in (41). Let the domain of
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interpretation be the set consisting in Rick, Randy, and Rod
((25) above.) Let ~ denote this set. The nine plurality
covers which can be associated with this set are given in (27)
and (29) above. In the case of (39.1) and (39.2), the function
assigned to the quantifier, 0°, takes the minimal plurality cover
(27.5) as the value of its first place: {[Rickl, {Ranqy},
{Rod}}. In the case of (39.3) and (39.4), it takes as values
members of plurality covers with no singletons: (27.1),
(29.1)-(29.3). Next, rowed is interpreted as a one-place
generalized propositional function. Since there are no nodes
distinct from the nodes dominated by SL in the path from the node
V to the node SL to which a value is assigned, S~ ~ VO , that
is, the generalized propositional function assigned to rowed.
Finally, the N~ node binds the NPL node which, in turn, is the
argument position to which the argument place of ~ is
assigned. So the interpretation of S. depends on N~P and s~: it
is the zero place generalized propositional function, that is,
one of the Boolean values 1 or 0, yielded when N~Q takes s~ as a
value.
So, in example (38.1), the ~alue is 1 just in case some
singleton in the minimal plurality cover of the set (24) rowed.
In example (38.2), the value is 1 just in case each such
s~ngleton rowed. In the last two examples, (38.3) and (38.4),
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the value is 1, just in case some and every set in a plurality
cover with no singletons rowed (respectively).
4.3.1 Simple Sentences with Reciprocal Pronoun ~rpreted
The interpretation of simple sentences with transitive verbs
and quantified noun phrases is a straightforward extension of the
previous case. I shall close this chapter, showing how the
principles of interpretation adduced so far provide a
straightforward and intuitively satisfying account of the
semantic interpretation of the reciprocal pronoun. Now, there is
only one possible configuration, at ss, for phraso markers of
simple sentences with reciprocal pronouns. This configuration is
given below.
(42)
each other
If a simple sentence contains no quantifiers, (42) is also the
configuration of the simple sentence's phrase marker at LF. I
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shall first confine my discussion to cases where N~ is not
quantified. Now, the fact that N~ is linked to NP, means that
each is assigned the same interpretation. But, this linking in
the case of a reciprocal pronoun means something more, namely,
that the reciprocal relation is to be defined on the same
plurality covering, and, in particular, a partition. In other
words, reciprocal pronouns do exactly what they purport to do:
to help express reciprocal relations. But these relations are
not Qefined on the set assigned to the antecedent of the pronoun,
but on a partition of the set, which, as was noted, is a
plurality covering of the set. The result of this shift in the
locus of the definition of the relation is that all the sentences
involving reciprocal pronouns fall to one principle of
interpretation, namely,
(43)
Principle of Interpretation for Reciprocal Pronouns<8>
Consider a phrase marker at LF in which the noun
phrase node NP t dominating a reciprocal pronoun has
N~ as an antecedent. The values assumed by N~
and NP~ when evaluated with respect to the function
interpreting the predicate (of which N~ and NP~ are
argument positions) are distinct members of a partition
of NP,o •
To show that this is so, I shall consider a few examples.
First, there is the example used to show that defining
reciprocity over all non-identical pairs of the relevant set is
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inadequate.
(44) Her grandparents hate each other.
As has been often pointed out, this sentence may be true even if
the reciprocal hatred is only between the maternal grandparents
on the one hand and the paternal ones on the other. But this is
to imply reciprocity defined over a partition of the
grandparents. Second, there are sentences where the reciprocal
pronoun seems to help to express a cyclic relation. This is
exemplified by the fact that the following sentence is made true
by a situation in which the children are playing musical chairs
but with enough cha~rs to go around and with everyone finding a
seat.
(45) The children displaced one another.
In such a situation, what is being expressed is that one member
of a bipartite partition of the children is displacing the other
member, and vice versa. Further confirmation of this treatment
of reflexive and reciprocal pronouns is forthcoming from two
pairs of interesting sentences discussed by Lauri Carlson (1982:
Part I, Sect. 9).
(46)
1. The men pulled themselves up.
2. The men pulled each other up.
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(47)
1. The men killed themselves.
2. The men killed each other.
Carlson maintains that these sentences are true in the following
circumstances. The first pair is true in the circumstances in
which two window washers, who are standing on a window washing
platform, pullan ropes on opposite sides of the platform thereby
raising the platform. The second pair is true in the event that
two men agree to drive their automobiles at each other, intending
and succeeding in the death of each. Now these judgments, which
I share, fall to the interpretation of reciprocal pronouns which
I am proposing. With regard to the first sentence in each pair,
the plurality cover is the set containing the pair of men~ With
regard to the second sentence in each pair, the plurality cover
is the partition which is the pair of singletons.
To conclude this treatment of the interpretation of the
reciprocal pronoun, I point out that nothing speciql need be said
to handle cases where the antecedent of the reciprocal pronoun is
a quantified noun phrase.<9>
~ lSO -
each othere
N
critics
~Sl~
~ S~
. ..-.-../ ~VP
/
v
I
detest
Q
Some
(48)
N~ is linked to N~ at SS (to meet condition (11) in 3.2.2
above) and NPL is linked to N~ through movement. Since N~ is a
quantifier, it binds N~ • And since N~ has the feature +PL, the
plurality cover which serves as the restricted domain of the
quantifier~ may contain no singletons (as was shown In 4.3
above). Hence, the two plqce function interpreting Scan
acquire its pairs of distinot values on some particular of the
non-singletons furnished by the quantifier.
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FOOTNOTES~CHAPTER FOU~
1. There is a use of the plural which is anomalous. Consider
the following sentence in the context where someone is
being disabused of the mistaken belief that Samuel Clemens
and Mark Twain are different persons.
(i) These men are the same person.
Clearly the denotation of the noun phrase these men does not
have a cardinality exceeding one.
2. This is an observation attributed to Hans Kamp by Lauri
Carlson (1982: Part I, Sect. 2).
3. lowe this pair of examples to Rick Lathrop.
4. This observation is due Carlson (1982: Part I, Sect. 4 and
10).
5. Some definitions of "cover" do not exclude the empty set.
6. Remember that QR adjoins a QNP to an S node in such a way
that each QNP, once moved, has an S node for a sister
node.
7. This is essentially what is given by Higginbotham (1981).
Notice that this principle is not a rule of truth.
8. ~his example was brought to my attention by Jim
Higginbotham.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE SEMANTICS OF LESS SIMPLE SENTENCES
5.0 Introduction
In this chapter, I shall extend the results of the previous
chapters to sentences more complex than simple ones. This
extension serves two purposes: it lends substantiation to the
results of the earlier chapters by showing their generality, and
it paves the way for the examination in the next chapter of the
claim made by Hintikka that there are sentences in natural
language, and in particular English, whose semantic
interpretation is properly represented only by branching
quantifiers.
In what way are the sentences to be treated here more
complex than those treated in the previous chapter? They are
more complex in that the verb phrase ~r the noun phrase is more
complex. In the case of the verb phrase, the complexity accrues
to the admission into it of what I shall argue are adverbial
modifiers. Here, what will be looked at are the so~called
"Q~float phenomena". In the case of the noun phrase, the
complexity accrues to the admission into it of conjunction,
adjectives and prepositional phrases. More specifically, I shall
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be examining sentences whose noun phrases consist ~ither in a
pair of conjoined simple noun phrases, or in a simple noun phrase
with an adjectival modifier, or in a simple noun phrase with a
prepositional phrase. I shall begin with the Q-float phenomenq.
~.1 Q-Float
~, all, and each, I c!aimed in the previous chapter, are
quantifiers. Quantifiers, in that chapter, are a ktnd of
determiner. Hence, these three words are determiners. Now no
one disagrees that determiners occur at the beginning of noun
phrases. But some sentences have both, all, or each in a
position which is not the beginning of a noun phrase. Here are
some examples.
( 1 )
1. The men all left.
2. The senators each resigned.
3. We both were arrested.
4. Harry saw them all.
Flango and Lasnik (1973: 447) attribute the observation qnd
a treatmept of such cases to Postal in his classes of 1971. 'J.'he
treatment, one gathers, is that such cases are derived by
transformation from the usual configuration of [NP DET N] •
Sentences which are the same as the ones in (1 ) except that their
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derivational history does not contain this postulated
transformation would be these.
(2 )
l. All of the men left.
2. Each of the senators resigned.
3. Both of us were arrested.
4. Harry sawall of them.
Subsequently, Postal (1974: Chapter 4, Sect. 5) draws attention
to a disparity between cases where the noun in the underlying
configuration is a pronoun and cases where it is not.
(3 )
1. They all, it seems to me, have the same outlook.
2. ?*The visitors all, it seems to me, have the same outlook.
3, They, it seems to me, all have the same outlook.
4. The visitors, it seems to me, all have the same outlook.
According to Postal, once the quantifier is floated, so to speak
~~ in this case, postposed -~ it has the option of forming a
constituent with the preceding noun, only if it is a pronoun, and
otherwise not. Postal, then, adopts the following structural
analysis for the sentences They all left and The ~ all l~.
(4 )
1. [They all] left.
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2~ [They] all left.
3. * [The men all] left.
4. [The men] all left.
Even if the judgments in (3) and (4) are correct, the
analysis, as it stanQs, leads to unequivocally incorrect
results.<l> This is pointed out by Maling (1976: 711).
(5 )
1. I like them all.
2. *I like the men all.
She suggests an alternative analysis based on the array of data
in 'rable 1.
all of the men
both of the men
each of the men
Q of the men
all of them
both of them
each of them
Q of them
all the men
both the men
""each the men
*Q tlle men
wall they/them
*both they/them
""each they/them
*Q they/them
Table 1
*the men all<2>
*the men both<2>
"'"the men each<2>
""the men Q
they/them all
they/them both
*they/them each
*they/them 0
(Q is any quantifier other than all, both, or each.) She
maintains that all and both are subject to a minor transformation
in which the preposition of is deleted.
~
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( 6 )
1. all of the men _..... _--> all the men
2. both of the men --~- .... > both the men
3. eac)h of the men -~---> *each the men
4. Q of the men
---- .... > *0 the men
She also notes that such a transformation, when freely applied,
yields incorrect results, if the noun in the prepositional phrase
is a pronoun.
(7 )
1. all of them -~---> *all they/them
2. both of them
---- .... > *both they/them
3. each of them - .... --,.> *each they/them
4. Q of them
-----> *Q of they/them
However, pronouns do permit all and bf.)th to occur after them.
-
(8 )
1. all of them ~-'"""'--> they/them all
2. both of them ----~> they/them both
3. each o~ them
-----> *they/them each <2 >
4. o of them --...., ..... _> *they/them Q
In short, both and all find themselves before q noun, if it is
not a pronoun, and after it, if it is one. Maling proposes,
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Ithen, that the deletion of the preposition 2£ is optional, but if
it results in a sequence of all or both and a pronoun then the
sequence must be inverted. This pair of minor transformations,
she holds, and Q-float together account for the occurrence of
these three determiners in positions other than at the beginning
of a noun phrase.
There are several considerations accruing from the
linguistic theory adopted in this thesis which militate against
any analysi~ of these cases as ones which result from movement in
the syntax, that is, which result from mappings from DS to 58 or
from 55 to LF. To see this, one need only reflect on sentences
which clearly do not involve the so~called minor transformations
and so only involve Q-float. Such sentences are just like those
in (1), except the verb is paraphrastic and the word each, ~~,
or all occurs between the auxilia~y and main verb.
(9 )
1. The men will all leave.
2. The senators have each resigned.
3. We were both arrested.
Now, were the occurrences of both, all and each to result from a
transformation like Q~float, the transformat~on would be an utter
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anomaly with respect to application of the rule move First,
movement in syntax typically applies to a uniform syntactic
class. In the case of NP-movement, a noun phrase is moved, since
otherwise it would not receive case. In the case of WH-movement,
a noun phrase with a WH feature is moved in virtue of the fact
that it has that feature. And in the case of Q-movement, a
quantified noun phrase is moved in virtue of the fact that the
noun phrase contains a quantifier. Q-float, in cont~ast, applies
to just three of the quantifiers.<3>
(10)
1. *The men will some leave.
2. *The senators have none resigned.
3. ~We were every arrested.
Second, the typical instances of move result in a whole phrase
being moved; but Q-float results in only a lexical item being
moved. Third, the positions to which phrases are moved by
NP-movement, WH-movement, or Q-movement are uniquely
characterizable. NP-movement moves a noun phrase to an argument
position which is not theta~marked; WH-movement moves a noun
phrase with a WH feature to COMP; and Q-movement moves a
quantified noun phrase to a position adjoined to S. In contrast,
Q-float does not move items to any uniquely characterizable
position.
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Abandoning a transformational account of the provenience of
these configurations involving each, both and all, one might be
tempted to invoke rules in the base as the source. But this will
not do. Presumably, lexical items are freely inserted under the
lexical nodes generated by the base. The question arises why
quantifiers other than each, both and all cannot be inserted in
the positions into which these three are inserted, as in (10)
above or in the following example:
(11)
1. *The men some leave.
2. *The senators none ~esign~d.
3. *We every were arrested.
Notice, however, that the positions in (1) and (9) in which each,
both and all occurs are positions in which adverbs occur.
(12)
1. The men discretely leave.
2. The senators quietly resigned.
3~ We frequently were arrested.
(13 )
1. The men will discretely leave.
2. The senators have quietly resigned.
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3. We were frequently arrested.
In light of this fact, I suggest that these three words have dual
lexical entries, one as determiner and one as adverb.
This suggestion does not encompass the cases which fall
under the purview of Maling's so-called minor transformations.
However, within the linguistic theory adopted here, these minor
transformations find their place, not in the mapping from DS to
SS, but in the mapping from 58 to PF. That is to say, the
configurations handled by these so-called minor transformations
are not syntactic, but phonological configurations idiosyncratic
to all and both. This, then, bears out the claim of the previous
chapter that determiners do not iterate, though phonological
idiosyncracies of all and path, triggered in the mapping from SS
to PF, create the illusion that all and both are exceptions to
the claim.
For the sake of thoroughness, I should mention that there
are occurrences of each, both, and all in positions other than
-- -
the ones discussed above. These cases involve sentences of a
complexity beyond those to be treated at in this thesis. Each,
both, or all may occur with an indirect object in the double
object construction (Maling 1976: 715-717).
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(14)
1. I gave the kids all some candy.
2. *1 gave some candy to the k~ds allG
(15)
1.
2.
(16)
1.
2.
The tooth fairy promised the kids each a quarter.
*The tooth fairy promised a quarter to the kids each.
.,
Dad bought the boys both bicycles.
*Dad bought bicycles for the boys both.
In addition, each, all, or both may occur at the beginning of
small clauses.
(17)
1. Morn found the boys both dirty.
2. We consider the Joneses all unbearably pompous.
3. The negotiator regards the parties as each an obstacle to
peace.
Finally, each of these three words may occur at the beginning of
prepositional phrases.
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(18)
1. He looked the twins both in the eye.
2. The godmother turned the pumpkins all into handsome
coaches.
3. She let the men each into the room.
The expectation is that these cases too will yield to an
adverbial account; but I shall make no attempt to spell out such
an account here.
I now turn to a semantic account of these three words
insofar as they have been analyzed above. Nothing special has to
be said about the cQnstruction where there is the phonological
deletion of the preposition 2£, or where the noun is a pronoun
and they have been postposed. As far as the structure at LF is
concerned, the configuration for interpretation is still [NP[N
all] [rr of ••• ]] or [NP[N both] Cpr of ••• ]]; for recall that the
alterations are phonological and not syntactic. The
interpretation of these phrases is that of a partitive,~ At the
same time, something special does need to be said for their
occurrences as adverbs.
I maintained in the last chapter that verbs are interpreted
as generalized propositional functions. The function takes
values in some plurality cover of the set denoted by the main
phrase in an argument position of the node to which the function
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is assigned. The adverbs all, both, and each restrict the
interpretation of the function interpreting the verb by
restricting the kinds of sets it can take as values. All
prohibits the function from taking singleton sets as values; each
requires the function to take singleton sets as values. Both
prohibits the function from taking singleton sets as values, but
requires that the set covered has a cardinality of two.
Reflection on a few examples will bear this interpretation out.
(19) The men all rowed.
This is true just in case every non-singleton set in some
plurality cover of the set denoted by ~ ~ rowed. In
particular, (19) can express the fact that a team of men were
involved in a co-operative effort to row a boat.
(20) The men each rowed.
This is true if each singleton in the minimal plurality cover of
the set denoted by the subject rowed. Note that whereas the
collective interpretation permits a distri~utive construal, the
distributive interpretation does not permit q collective
construal. This asymmetry as to what construal the semantic
interpretations are liable, it was argued in the previous
chapter, is a fact about how humans conceive collective objects
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and about how beliefs determine the relation which properties
thought to hold of a collective object bear to objects in the
collection. Finally,
(21) The men both rowed,
is true, just in case a doubleton of men is denoted by the men
and they rowed.
Let me now turn to the interaction of the adverbs each, ~
and all with anaphoric pronouns. Consider first the cases where
the anaphoric pronoun is reflexive.
(22)
1. The contestants each admire themselves.
2. The contestants both admire themselves.
3. The contestants all admire themselves.
As l stated above, the adverbs in their interpretation, force the
function assigned to the verb to select a plurality cover of the
set denoted by the subject noun phrase. Of course the denotation
assigned to the position of the reflexive pronoun must be the
same as that assigned to its antecedent, but the plurality covers
associated with each position need not be the same. This is
borne out by the availability of readings consistent with
restrictions on the plurality covers. For example, (18.1) is
true, even if each contestant fails to admire himself, but
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admires only the group of which he is a member; and (18.3) is
true, even if no contestant admires the group of which he is a
member, and admires only himself.
Coming to the cases where the anaphoric pronoun is
reciprocal, one finds the situation is no longer so simple. This
is because there are now two conditions on the interpretation of
the verb, one due to the reciprocal pronoun and one due to the
adverb. That is to say, the reciprocal pronoun has the
requirement that it and its antecedent be interpreted with
respect to the same plurality cover (see (45) in 4.3.1 above);
while the adverb specities the kind of set on which the function
assigned to the verb may compute.
(23)
1. *The contestants each endorsed one another.
2. The contestants both endorsed each other.
3. The contestants all endorsed one another.
In ,23.1), the conditions which must be met for the
interpretation of the reciprocal pronoun are pre-empted by the
conditions placed on the interpretation by the adverb. The
adverb each requires that the function assigned to the verb take
singletons as values; but encoded into the same function through
the interpretation of the reciprocal pronoun is the requirement
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that the function take as values sets which can be partitioned
into at least two distinct sets. Singletona, though, cannot be
so partitioned. Such a conflict cannot arise for (23.2) and
(23.3) since the adverbs require the function assigned to the
verb to take non-singletons as values, and every non-singleton
can be partitioned into at least two distinct sets.
There is a curiosity pertaining to the interpretation of
(23.3). The adverb all, I said, requires the function assigned
to the verb to take non-singletons as values; the reciprocal
pronoun requires that the values be partitionable into at least
two distinct sets. Yet the interpretation of sentences like
(23.3) is that the partition is atomic (i.e., the partitIon is
into singletons). The question arises: why should not an
interpretation with a non-atomic partition be available? Perhaps
the answer is that the adverb requires the function assigned to
the verb to take its values in the maxj~mal plurality cover,
instead of in any plurality cover containing no singletons. The
maximal plurality cover contains ol,ly one set, namely the set
covered. What has been observed so far is that the choice of
plurality cover is free, unless overtly constrained by a
quantifying determiner or adverb. This means that, unless
overtly constrained, the choice of plurality cover is open to
extra~samantic determination. Quantifying determiners and
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adverbs introduce constraints and preclude extra-semantic
determination of the plurality cover. So, when the reciprocal
pronoun required a partilion of the sole set in the maximal
plurality cover, there is no extra-semantically determined
partition to adopt and so the function takes a default value of
the atomic part i, t lo,n.
Let me pursue this analysis in terms of sentences formed
from simple ones by replacing the subject noun phrase with one
consisting in a pair of conjoined simple ones. Such a sentence
is the one below.
(24) The man anfJ the woman are row i ng.
To begin with, one can ask: which syntactic feature, +PL or -PL,
does the subjec~ noun phrase have? The answer comes from the
fact that verbs agree with their subjects in number; in other
words, the form of the verb is sensitive to the syntactic feature
+PL of its subject noun phrase. In the example above, the
subject noun phrase is a conjunction of two noun phrases aach of
which has the syntactic feature -PL. Clearly the syntactic
feature +~L of the subject is a function of the noun phrase as a
conjunction. Notice that this feature assignment is independent
of whether or not the constituent noun phrases have count or mass
nOUI1S as heads.
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(25)
1. The gold and the water are on the counter.
2. Gold and water are on the counter.
The pertinent syntactic prin~iple is this:
(26) Principle of Syntactic Plurality in Conjoined Noun Phrases
If NP, consists in the conjunction of two or more NP's,
then NP, is assigned the syntactic feature +PL.
This principle sheds light on the jUdgments of the following
examples.
(27)
1. *Chunka and Sho respect himself.
2. Chunka and Sho respect themselves,
These sentences have the same structure at SSe
(28)
/VP~
V NP
/'
NPa
,
N
I
Chunka
s
~
NP......----.........
I~
CONJ NP,
I
N
I
and Sho respect.
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I
N
I
himself
themselves
In the case of (27.1), there are only three noun phrases other
than the one containing the reflexive pronoun. NP., though it
a-commands NP~, cannot be the antecedent of NP~, since NP~ has
the feature ~PL and N~ has, in accordance with (26) above, the
feature +PL. But, it was observed in a previous chapter, a noun
phrase and its antecedent must have the same syntactic feature.
(See (9.2) in 3.2.2 above.) Hence, one has an account for the
ungrammaticalityof (27.1). In the case of (27.2), the disparity
in syntactic features between NP£ and NP+ and between NP~ and NP~
as well as the fact that neither NPa nor NP& a-commands NP4
eliminates them from being antecedents of N~. However, NP,
a-commands NP+ and its syntactic features agree with those of
NPt' so that NP, may, and indeed must, be NP+'s antecedent.
Turning from the reflexive to the reciprocal pro~oun, one
sees exactly what the structure and interpretation of the next
sentence are.
(29) Chunka and Sho respect each other.
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(30)
J
N
I
Chunka and
I
N
I
Sho respect
I
N
I
each other
There is, of course, only one plurality cover of the set {Chunka,
She} which forms a partition with at least two distinct elements,
namely, {{Chunkal, {Shol!_ As one should expect, the adverbial
modification by both of the verb in sentence (29) is acceptable.
(31) Chunka and Sho both respect each other.
The next sentence also has the structure which (29) has at 58.
(32) The men and the women admire each other.
Now (29) permits only one interpretation, since the
interpret~tion of its N~ node must have a cardinality of two;
(32) permits many interpretations. One reading which is made
salient by the conjunction in N~, is one where the reciprocal
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relation is defined over the pair in the binary partition of the
set denoted by the ~ and the women, namely, the pair consisting
in the set denoted by the men and the set denoted by the women.
The grammar has a device by which to make this reading explicit.
(33) The men and the women both admire each other~
The only ~nterpretation of (33) is that the men admire the women
and the women admire the men. The adverb both, which requires
that the subject noun phrase denote a set of cardinality of two,
thereby insures that the men and the women are each collectively
----, -
interpreted, that is, each deI,otes a collect iva ob ject. Another
interpretation available to (32) is the one in which the
reciprocal relation is defined over every pair of members taken
from the union of the sets denoted by the ~ and the women. The
grammar also, as was seen earlier, has a device by which to make
this reading explicit.
(34) The men and the women all admire one another~
In light of these results, one sees forthcoming further
confirmation of the view held here, namely, that plural noun
phrases are evaluated, as arguments, with respect to some
plurality cover, the selection of which is constrained by
extra-grammatical considerations. Consider a sentence discussed
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by Langendoen (1978: 182):
(35) The men and the woman flirted with one another.
The interpretation ascribed to it is that the men flirted with
the woman and she with the men. Of course, this is one
interpretation, the analysis of which is essentially that of
(32), except one element in the binary partition of the set
denoted by toe ~ and the woman is a singleton, namely, the
singleton denoted by the woman. The interpretation is favored
not only by the syntax, since the conjunction ~ makes salient
this partition, but also by cultural attitudes, since
non~heterosexual behavior is not usually expected. This reading
can, of course, be made explicit.
(36) The men and the woman both flirted with each other.
However, there is the reading with the flirting taking place
between each distinct pqir in the set denoted by union of the set
denoted by the ~ and the set denoted by the woman. This
t
reading c~n be made explicit too.
(37) The men and the woman all flirted with one another.
5.2 The Noun Phrase Revisited
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I turn from the analysis of the so-called Q-float phenomena
to one of various enrichments of the simple noun phrase. In
particular, I shall disouss noun phrases in which a simple noun
phrase is augmented by an adjective preceding the noun or by a
single prepositional phrase following the noun, the prepositional
phrase consisting of the preposition of and a simple noun
phrase. Examples of such noun phrases are these.
(38)
1. [ III' the lAP long] march
2. [NP this [AP nuclear] explosion]
3. [ NP any governor (Pf of a state))
4. ( liP the queen (pp of Bhutan] )
Little has been done within the linguistic framework adopted in
this thesis on the semantic interpretation of adjectives, and
work on the structure and inte~pretation of prepositional phrases
is still in its inception. The semantic analysis presented below
is intended to be suggestive, not comprehensive.
5.2.1 Simple~ Phrase with Prenominal Adjective Interpreted
As usual in this thesis, the treatment of semantics begins
with an analysis of syntax. Adjectives may occur in a number of
positions in a phrase marker.
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(39)
1. The poem is [~ long].
2. The apples were picked [AP ~ipe]~
3. The house [~P ablaze] is next doora
4. A [~P long] march took place in China.
Even within a noun phrase, as the examples above show, adjectives
may occur before or after the noun. The interest here is
adjectives in a noun phrase which precede the noun. Such
adjectives received some attention in the second chapter (i.e.,
in 2.1.1) whe~e prenominal adjectives were distinguished from
determiners. I pointed out there that such adjectives were of a
heterogenous mix, including cardinality adjectives, predicating
adjectives, and thematic adjectives. Although the semantio
interpretation of adjectives must be sensitive to the differences
among these types of adjectives, nonetheless they can all be
interpreted by the same formal device. I shall concentrate only
on the application of this formal device to predicating
adjectives; but that it can be applied to the other types of
adjectives is obvious.
Clearly adjectives take arguments. That is to say, a
lex~cql entry for an adjective specifies that it has an
argument. More specifically, I suggest that an adjective, like a
verb, has a distinguished argument place, but unlike a verb, it
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may not have any undistinguished argument places. This recelves
some substantiation from the fact that the complements of
adjectives are never simple noun phrases but are rather
prepositional phrases.
(40 )
1. *proud Satish
2. proud of Satisn
I suggest further that an adjective, like a verb, is interpreted
as a function. The n-place function assigned to a verb with
n~arguments has the Boolean values {O,l} for its range, while the
one-place function assigned to an adjective has subsets of the
domain for its range. Indeed, the set yielded from the one-place
function assigned to an adjective is a subset of the set assigned
to the noun it modifies. So, for example, the noun phrase the
rich men denotes, modulo the deictic constraint imposed by the
--,~
indefinite article, a subs~t of the set denoted by men such that
they are rich. What, exactly, this function is is stated below.
(41) Principle of Interpretation of Adjectives
Let A be an adjective. Let 0 be a domain of
individuals whose power set is the domain of
interpretation. Let AD be the extension of the
adjective in the domain. AP(y) is the one-place
function, Ap n Y" where Y takes sets as values
and AD yields sets as values.
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The principle has several attractive features. First, it
accomodates the interpretation of iterated adjectives, be they
co-ordinated or embedded. Co~ordinated adjectives are
interpreted as the intersection of the functions assigned to each
of the adjectives co-ordinated; adjectives within adjective
phrases are interpreted as the composition of the functions
assigned to each adjective in the embedding, the most embedded
adjective corresponding to the left-most function in the
composition of functions. Let me illustrate this point with a
pair of examples.
(42)
1. these lAP rich] lAP handsome] lawyers
2. the lAP lAP happy] young] adults
Second, this principle also accomodates the fact that adjectival
modification of a noun may eliminate, or interfere with, the
denotation of the whole noun phrase. In (42.1), for example, the
domain may have lawyers, but no rich and handsome ones, so that
while lawyers will denote a non~singleton subset of the domain,
the whole phrase will denote the null set. And, this principle
interacts with the principles pertaining to the syntax and
semantics of the feature +PL to interfere, in the way in which
the facts require, with the denotation of the entire noun
phrqse. To see this, recall that the syntactic features of a
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head no~n are assigned to its phrasal node (i.e., maximal
projection), that is, its noun phrase. (See (24.2) of 2.1.3
above.) Recall also that the interpretation of the features of
+PL puls constraints on the cardinality of the set denoted by the
associated node. (See (3) of 4.1.1 above.) This implies, in the
case of (42"2), that the denotation of the entire phrase must
have such a denotation. Yet the function assigned to the largest
adjective pllrase may, in a suitably chosen domain, return to a
singleton s\~bset of the domain. In such a situation, the noun
phrase is clearly to be judged anomalous, and the principles
adduced here reflect that judgement.
Finally, notice that (41) can be easily adapted to
accomodate collective and distributive readings by modifying the
functions in (41) to compute over plurality covers. Assuming
that words such as swarming or rolling are not participles but
adjectives, one might think the following ex~mples warrant such a
modification.<4>
(43)
1. *the swarming bee
2. the swarming bees
3. ""the rolling hill
4. the rolling hills
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It is clear that a bee does not swarm but that bees swarm, and
that a hill does not roll (in the relevant sense) but that hills
roll. This means that such expressions as rolling and swarmi~
must have readings where they are true of plurality covers of the
denotation of the nouns they modify which do not contain
singletons from the domain. It is also clear that they may have
t~ yield such plural~ty covers as values.
(45)
1. *the swarming bees each fly.
2. the swarming bees all fly.
Another enrichment of the simple noun phrase susceptible of
interpretation on the basis of a straightforward extension of
principles found in the earlier chapters is the simple noun
phrase augmented by a prenominal cardinal adjective. Examples of
such noun phrases are: two~, three women, seven
archaeologists. The interpretation of the cardinal adjective is
a cardinal number; and the interpretation of the augmented simple
noun phrase in which they cardinal adjective occurs is the set
denoted by the simple noun phrase itself such that its
cardinality is the number denoted by the cardinal adjective.
~hat is,
(46) Principle of Interpretation for Simple Noun Phrases
Let D be a domain of individuals whose power
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set is the domain of interpretation. Let
[NP [AP A] [j N]] be ~~noun phrase. Let AD = n.
Then NpP = NO and IN I = n.
Thus, ~ ~ denotes any set of two men, three women denotes any
set of three women, etc.
With this principle and those of the last chapter, sentences
like the following are easily interpreted.<5>
(47) Two men visited two WOinen.
Now let two ~ denote the set consisting in Riel, and ~andy and
let tw'~ women denote the set consisting in Diane and Lillian.
There are eight readings (see Figure 2 in 4.3 above), one of
which is that Rick visited Diane and R~ndy visited Lillian (see
(4) in Figure 2 of 4.3 above). This reading cannot be captured
if ~ is a quantifier and QR applies to all quantifiers, for one
occurrence of two must then have wider scope than the other; but
no one person visits or is visited by any two others. On the
view here, cardinal adjectives are not determiners (see 2.1.1
above), hence not quantifiers, nor are they lexically derived
from quantifiers, so they are not subject to OR. Moreover, on the
view here, all readings are captured.<6>
Before adverting to simple noun phrases with prepositional
phrases, I shall address a question raised, but not answered, in
the third chapter (namely, in 3.1.1 above): the question of the
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principle of interpretation for demonstratives. I suggested
there that demonstratives can be assigned nemantic features
(e.g., +DEICTIC or -DEICTIC, and +PROXIMATE or -PROXIMATE) and
that the interpretation of demonstratives is a Boolean function
of functions interpreting these features. Left unresolved was
the kind of function to be assigned to these semantic features.
These functions have subsets of the domain of interpretation as
their domain and subsets of the objects of the situation of
utterance fer thei~ range. This can be formulated more precisely
qS follows:
(48) Principle of Interpretation for Demonstratives
Let D be a domqin of individuals. And let the
power set of 0 be the domain of interpretation. Let
S be the objects in the situation of utterance. Let
A be a demonstrative and a" ••• , an its associated
features. a~ , ••• , a~ is the extension of
these features in the situation of utterance. Let
AD be a Boolean function in a~ f ••• f an
Then pf (Y) .. AD n y. 0
So while demonstratives and adjectives fall into distinct
syntactic categories, thay are subject to the same ~ind of
interpreting function, differentiated only by a difference in
ranges and domains of the functions.
5.2.2 Simple Noun Phrases with Prepositional Phrases Interpreted
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The interpretation of a noun phrase which consists in a
simple noun phrase augmented by a prepositional phrase, which
itself conslsts in the preposition 2! and a simple noun phrase,
is a more involved task than the one just undertaken, for the
results of earlier chapters have not prepared the way to the same
degree. First, there ~s no discussion of prepositions and
prepositional phrases in the earlier chapters. It turns out that
there are different configurations into which a noun which is the
head of a noun pnrasu and a prepositional phrase can enter.
Second, no treatment of the argument structure of nouns was
undertaken in earliet ChtlJters. And, it turns out that there are
count nouns, which are to be interpreted as sets. The sets which
they a~~ assigned are determined by their argument structur6; and
the determination is effected through the syntactic configuration
in which the noun with the argument structure finds itself.
Below, I shall exe,ine first the syntax of prepositional phrases
within noun phrases, isolating therej,n one configuration which
will prove pertinent to the discussion in the next chapter.
Than, I shall adve~t to the structure of the lexical entry of a
noun, concent.~atin~ on the argum~nt structure of a noun, and
again isolating a class of nouns in terms of their argulnent
structure which will Inter prove germane.
Since Jackendoff (1977: Chapter 4, Sect. 5), it has been
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widely assumed that there are two positions in the phrase marker
of a noun phrase for a prepositional phrase: one position is
sister to the N node of the noun phrase, the other is sister to
the N node uf the noun phrase. These positions are illustrated
below as PP, and };)P1-' and will be referred to as N complement
prepositional phrases and N complement prepositional phrases,
respectively.
(49)
N,
/'"N PP,
/"P, NPa
This distin~tion in syntactic configuration provid~s a basis
for accounting fo~ the following facts. First, while some
prepositional phrases may not iterate, others may.
(50)
1. a student [pp with a scar] [pp from Canada]
2. a cottage [pp by a lake) (pp in a woods]
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3. *the kind [pp of France] (pp of Engla,ld]
4. *the dislike [ppof bathing] [ppof children]
Second, in some iterations of prepositional phrases, the
prepositional phrases do not permute.
(51)
1. every relative [pp of my mother] [pp from Ireland]
2. ?*every relative [pp from Ireland] [pp of my mother]
3. the queen [pp of Bhutan] [pp from Manhatten]
4. *the queen [pp from Manhatten] [fP of Bhutan]
Finally, the antecedents of 2rr!, the pronoun, sometimes includes
the prepositional phrase in the noun phrase, and sometimes does
not.
(52)
1. Dave met the queen from Kensington, and Peter met the one
from Manhattan.
2. *Dave met the queen of England, and Peter met the one of
Bhutan.
Now these facts are implied on the basis of the syntax of (49)
with the additional assumptions that the antecedent of ~ is an
Nnode and that only Ncomplement prepositional phrases iterate.
Adopting, then, this analysis of prepositional phrases, I can now
state more preoisely the syntactic configuration, the semanlic
inte~pretation of which is the concern of the remainder of this
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chapter; simple noun phrases augmented by N complement
prepositional phrases whose own noun phrases are simple ones.
If N complement prepositional phrases provide the relevant
noun phrases, what kind of count noun provides the relevant kind
of head noun? In the previous chapter, the principle for the
interpretation of nouns took account of nouns with no argument
structure in their lexical entries. And surely there are nouns
witn no argument structure: ~,woman, elephant, bagpipe,
chopstick, etc. But it also seems that there are nouns with
argument structure: seduction, dislike, refusal, etc. It is
through the ascription of argument structure to such nouns that
some expect to capture the undeniable parallel between sentences
and noun phrases.
(53)
1. Cleopatra seduced Julius Ceasar.
2, Cleopatra's seduction of Julius Ceasar
(54)
1. Every boy dislikes bathing.
2. Every boy's dislike of bathing
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(55)
1. Nabil refused an offer.
2. Nabil's refusal of an offer
But the nouns with qrgument structu~e are not just those which
are derived from verbs. Nouns such as relative, sister, friend,
capital, king, etc., qlso have argument structure too; and it is
these nouns, which I shall call "relational nouns", Wl1ich are of
interest here.
Having identified N complement prepositional phrases and the
class of relational nouns, I can state more precisely the aim of
the balance of this section of the chapter: to provide the
principles of interpretation whereby the interpretation of Ncan
be g~ven in terms of the interpretation of N and its
complementary prepositional phrase, where N is a relational
noun, But these principles are already in place, except for a
slight enrichment of the principle for the interpretation of
count nouns presented in the fourth chapter. So let me stale how
the principle is to be enriched, then I shall proceed to show how
the principles stated so far provide an interpretaf;ion for the
kind of N just identified.
The principle for the interpretation of count llouns given in
the third chapter is simple: a count noun is assigned a subset
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of the domain of interpretation, in particular, its extension in
the domain. (See (5) in 3.2.1 above.) There seems to be no
grounds to abrogate such a principle for the interpretation of
relational count nouns. Consider these examples:
(56)
1. The relatives are visiting.
2. My friends like one another.
Yet, the set assigned to a relational count noun evidently
depends on the set assigned to the noun phrase in its
complementary prepositional p~rase, for the denotation of the
subject noun phrase in each of the next examples is different
from that in the others.
(57)
1. The re~~tives of my father are visiting.
2. The relatives of my mother are visiting.
3. The relatives of my wife are visiting.
How, then, are relational count nouns to be interpreted? The
answer, I believe, lies in the vary description of the problem:
a relational count noun is assigned a subset nf the domain or a
set provided by a function also assigned to the count noun, which
has for its domain subsets of the domain of interpretation and
has for its range subsets of the set assigned to the count noun
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itself. The precise formulation is the following:
(58) Principle of Interpretation for Count Nouns:
Let C be a count noun. Let 0 be the domain of
interpretation. Let C~ be the extension of C in D.
(1) If C has no argument place, then cP = CD •
(2) If C has an argument place, then C~ is
a function of subsets of 0 into subsets of CD •
How these principles work requires some explanation. Bear
in mind that the interest here is only in count nouns. Above, I
po~nted out that some count nouns have arguments and others do
not. Moreover, I adduced the view that the N node has only two
configurations:
(59)
( 1 ) N
I
N
( 2 )
So, there are only four cases to consider. Suppose a count noun
is inserted under N which has no argument. Then regardless of
whether it is in one or the other of the configurations in (59),
it does not have an argument to assign, so only clause (2) will
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apply. Now suppose a count noun with an argument is inserted
under an N node. Then the question arisea: to what is the
argument assigned? An answer to this question was proposed in a
previous chapter: a distinguished argument is assigned to an
external argument position and an undistinguished argument is
assigned to an internal argument position. Nouns, I observed
above, have only undistinguished arguments; and a relational
count noun has only one undistinguished argument. So, in the
first configuration in (59), there is no external argument
position wit!l reSgect to N within N. Indeed, since N immediately
dominates only one other node, then the interpretation of the
node N is the same as that of N, according to the principl~ that
non-branching nodes are essentially semantically vacuous. (See
(2) in 4.1.1 above.) Now in the second configuration of (59),
the NP node is the internal argument position of the nodE., N,
hence the count noun in question assigns its undistinguished
argument to the NP node, so clause (1) of (58) will apply wi,th
--Dthe result that N is the subset of Cp nssigned by f c at the
value NpD, that is to say,
( 60 ) [R' [If' C) [ pp [p 0 f ] [ ~p A) ) ] I) ;::; f c. (NP~ ) •
To insure that the application of these prj,nciples is clear,
let me rehearse an example. Consider the noun phrase which is
the subject of (57.1), It has the structure of (59.2). The noun
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phrase ~ father is interpreted as a singleton in the domain of
interpretation. The noun relatives, which has the syntactic
feature +PL, is assigned a set in the same domain as well as a
function from subsets of the domain into subsets of the
non-singleton assigned to relatives. The feature +PL is assigned
to the node NP by the rule that features of heads are assigned to
their phrasal nodes. (See (24.2) in 2.1.3 above.) Now relatives
has an qrgument, and by the rules of argumen; assignment, it is
assigned to the NP node dominating ~ father. (See (24) of 3.3
above.) Hence, the first N node contained in the subject noun
phrase will be assigned the set yielded by the function assigned
to relatives at the value assigned to the NP node dominating ffil
father. Presumably this set is all those related to my father.
Were relatives replaced by sisters and the person denoted by ffil
father an only child, then the noun phrase \IQulct fail to denote.
And if the person denoted by ~ father had just one sister, then
the interpretation of the NP node dominating the prepositional
phrase would fail to meet the condition imposed by the feature of
+PL, since the set assigned to the NP node would be a singleton
but the feature requires that the set have a cardinality greater
than one.
5.3 Conclusion
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,It should now be clear that one has the syntactic and
semantic wherewithal to provide interpretations for fairly
complex sentences, including ones like the following:
(61)
1. The sisters of my father and the brothers of my mother are
rowing.
2. The boys and the girls respect one another.
3. Every governor of some state and every district attorney of
some municipality met the prasident.
4. Every relative of some villager and every relative of some
townsman hate each other.
It is precisely sentences like the last one which Hintikka claims
to require branching quantification for their proper semantic
representation. In the next chapter, I shall examine Hintikka's
claims and evaluate his treatment of sentences like (61.4) in
light of the results I have set out so far 1n this thesis.
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FOOTNOTES ~ CHAPTER f'IVE
1, This point is acknowledged by Postal (1976: 153, n. 11).
2. The claim is that this is not a constituent; it is not that
this sequence cannot occur. For the t~me being, think of
these judgments as made with respect to frame sentences
like (5.2).
3, This point is acknowledged by Postal (1976: 153, n. 10).
4, Expressions of this kind were pointed out to me by Lenhart
Schubert.
5, This problem and example was brought to my attention in
lectures by Jim Higginbotham during his course in the
Spring term of 1983.
6. In my judgment, phrases such as ~ ~ have specifiG and
non-specific readings. If this is so, th~se facts would
fall within the purview of the treatment of the indefinite
article by Fodor and Sag (1982) to the effect that it is
both a quantifier and a demonstrative, under the
supplementary hypothesis that the plur~l form of the
indefinite article is phonetically null, Greg Carlson
(l977) notwithstanding (see 3.1.1 above). In this event,
such phrase as two men would be subject to QR when they
contain the pllAral form of the quant if iar a. Bu t th is
would in no way interfere with the readings above.
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CHAPTER SIX
HINTIKKA AND BRANCHING QUANTIFIERS
6.0 Introduction
In a series of articles starting in 1973<1>, Hintikka has
argued for the view that there are sentences of English,
quantificational aspects of which are properly represented by
branching quantifiers. Among his examples are these:
(1 )
1
... .
2.
Some book by every author is referred to in some essay by
every critic.
Some relative of every villager and some relative of every
townsman hate each other.
In this chapter, I shall scrutinize the view both in terms of the
evidence he brings to bear and in terms of the syntactic and
semantic analysis presented in the previous chapters. This
scrutiny will reveal that what Hintikka alleges to be the truth
conditions of these sentences is wrong and that they can receive
a better, and different, analysis through the view adopted or
developed above. As Hintikka's own proposal is based on the
notion of branching quantifiers, let me first summarize the facts
pertaining to this theory of logic.
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6.1 Theory ~f Branclling Quantification
The idea of branching quantif\cation, or finite
partially-ordered quantification, was first propounded by Leon
Henkin (1961). This theory is a generalization of the syntax of
quantifiers of first order predicate logic which are in prenex
normQl form. (A formula of fir~t order logic is in prenex normal
form, if every propositional connective is within the scope of
every quantifier.) Thus, for example, "3y" is within the scope
of "Vx" in the formula below.
(2) Vx (Fx ~-~-> 3y Gy)
So it is not prenex normal form. On the other hand, the next
formula is.
(3) Vx3y (Fx --> Gy)
Now it is a (meta-)theorem of first order logic that eactl formula
has an equivalent in prenex normal form. So, a formula which is
not in prenex normal form, like the following,
(4) ixVy (Fxy --~-> Vy3x Gxy) 4f
has a formula which is logically equivalent to it and in prenex
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normal form<2>, namely,
(5) 3xVyVvlw (Fxy ----> Gwv).
A formula in prenex normal form can be thought to be made up of
two parts, a prefix which consists in all the quantifiers, and a
matrix which consists in all the formula but the prefix. So, in
(5), "~xVyVv3w" is the prefix and "(Fxy ---> Gwv)" is the
matrix. Now, in first order logic, the elements of a formula are
totally ordered. That is to say, for any two elements, if
neither precedes the other then they are the same element.
Formulae in prenex normal form, of course, are totally ordered.
In particular, the quantifiers of the prefix are totally
ordered: that is, for any two quantifiers, if neither precedes
the other, then they are identical. This implies that the
relation of scope between quantifiers (in the prefix of a formula
in prenex normal form) is defined for Qny pair of quantifiers.
In the theory of finite partially-ordered quantification
(i.e., the theory of branching quantification), the prefixes are
permitted to be partially ordered (i.e" "branch"), That is, it
is no longer the case that either two quantifiers are so arranged
that one precedes the other or they are identical, So, they can
- 195 -
be unordered with respect to one another. This, in turn, implies
that the relation of scope is not defined for every pair of
quantifiers. For example, the quantifiers "\tx" and "3y" are
unordered with respect to one another in the next formula, and so
the relation of scope is not defined between them.
(6 )
Vx
>FXY3y
In the next formula, ""Ix" and "ly" are ordered with respect to
each other, as are "Vv" and "3W"i but "\Ix" and "Vv" are not
ordered with respect to each other, as are not "3w" and "3y".
(7 )
Vx ly
> FxyvwVv ~w
Now, some observations about the theory of branching
quantification are in order. First, since a total ordering is a
special case of a partial ordering, formulae of first order
predicate logic in prenex normal form are a special case of the
formulae of the theory of branching quantification. It is
convenient to designate any formula of the theory of branching
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quantification which is not also a formula of first order
predicate logic as "properly branching", and any which is a
formula of both as "improperly branching". On this convention,
(6) and (7) are properly branching formulae, whereas (5) is
improperly branching. Second, Walkoe (1970: 542) has shown that
every properly branching formula has an equivaloliL, both among
formulae of the kind indicated by (8), and among the formulae of
the kind indicated by (9),
(8 )
Vx, •••• VXj 1Y. • ••• J~
Vv, •• ,. "vI{ ~ w, •••• 3wL.
(9 )
Third, some properly branching formulae have first order
equivalents, as shown in the table below (taken from Barwise
1979).
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P~operly Branching Formulae
(10)
Vx
>FXy
\ly
(11)
3x>FXY3y
(12)
~x>FXY3y
(13)
Vx3y>Fxyvw
'tv3w
Equiva!ent Non-Branching Formulae
VxVy FKy
3yax Fxy
3f3gVx~v F K f(x) v g(v)
Table 1
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But some properly branching formulae have no first order
equivalent. The simplest such formula is (7), repeated as (13)
in Table 1. However, as shown by Enderton (1970: 394), every
properly branching formula does have a logically equivalent
formula in a restricted class of formulae of second order
predicate logic. The logical equivalent of (13) is this formula
of second order logic.
(14) 3f~gVx\fv F x f(x) v g(v)
What is, intuitively, the relation between (7) and (14), that is,
the pair of formulae in (13)1 The properly branching formula of
(13) tells one that the value of "y" is permitted to depend only
on the value of "x" (in any event, it does not depend on the
value of "v" or ()f "WU) and that the value of "w" is permitted to
depend only on the 'lalue of n v " (and again, in any event, it does
not depend on the value of "x" or of "yn). And this was also
asserted in the second order formula of (14); for it says that
the value of "y", if it is a ft\nct ion of anyth i og, is a funct ion
only of the value of "x" and that the value of "w", if it is a
function of anything, is a function only of the value of "v",
In contrast, consider the simple formula of first order
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logic whose parts are only "'Vx.3y", "'fv3w", and "Fxyvw", taken
from (14).<3>
(15) Vx~yVv3w Fxyvw
Returning to the intuitive conception of quantifier order
mentioned above, one can see that in (15), as in (7), the value
of "y" may depend only on the value of "x". But, in (15), the
value of "w" may depend on the values of both "x" and of "v";
whereas, in (7), it may depend only on the values of "xu. In
other words, both in (7) and in (15), the value of "y" may be a
function only of the value of "x"; but in (15), the value of "w"
may be a function both of the value of "x" and the value of "v",
while in (7) it may be only a function of the value of "v".
Using the same function notation of second order logic which was
used above, one can represent (l5) as follows:
(16) 3f3gVxVv F x f(x) v g(x,v)
This formula, which is logically equivalent to (15), differs from
the one in (14), which is logically equivalent to (7), inasmuch
as the fourth place of the predicate is a function of one
variable, namely g(v), in the case of (14), but is a function of
two variables, namely g(x,v), in the case of (15). Since
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functions of two variables include, as degenerate cases,
functions of one variable, it follows that the set of models
satis~ying (14) is a subset of those satisfying (16). Therefore,
(14) implies (16), and so (7) implies (15). The converse
implication, as will be shown, does not hold.
It is convenient to mention in passing that the formula
(17) Vx~v~y3w Fxyvw
is implied by (16). FCtllowing the same reasoning as above, one
observes that (17) is logically equivalent to the second order
formula
(18) 3f~gVxYv F x f(x,v) v g(x,v).
(16) is evidently a special case of (7), and _lance has only a
subset of the models satisfying (18) satisfying it.
6.2 Branching Quantifiers and Simple Sentences
Having said this much about the theory of branching
quantification, let me turn to the theory of quantification in
natural language. In Chaper One, I sketched a view of
quantifiers to natural language which not only holds that
~elations of scope qmong quantifiers obtain but also shows how
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these relations are defined on the basis of the syntactic
structure of sentences. Hintikka's view is unclear on both of
these points. While it is implicit in his discussion that
quantifiers may enter into relations of scope, he is silent on
the issue of how these relations are to be assigned. This
silence is a persistent shortcoming of Hintikka's treatment of
the sentences he scrutinizes; and this shortcoming is easily
overlooked when one is embroiled in the details of the analysis
of the more complex sentences he presents. To highlight its
importance, let me turn first to a treatment of the relations of
scope found in sentences syntactically simpler than those
discussed by Hintikka. Hintikka does not explicitly propose to
use branching Quantifiers to represent their semantics; but to
see why one ought not to use branching quantifiers in their
treatment will b~ing into salience a point which carries over to
the treatment of the syntQctically more complex sentences
actuallt discussed by Hintikka.
To begin with, ~econsider these sentences of tw~~ quantifiers
and one b~nary relation.
(19)
1. Every man admires every woman.
2. Some man admires some woman.
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3. Every man admires some woman.
4. Some man admiros every woman.
Now, how might branching quantifiers be used here? One might
propose that the quantifiers of natural language (within a simple
sentence) bear no relations of scope. This would be represented
by having all the quantifiers in the sentence re~resented by a
branching formula with as many branches as there are quantifiers
in the sentence. This proposal does not run afoul of the facts,
as evidenced by (19.1) and (19.2), for the two improperly
branching representations on the one hand and the one properly
branching representation on the other are equivalent for each
sentence. (See Table 1.) But all other things being equal, the
representation by properly branching quantification would be
gratuitous. Now a representation by properly branching
quantification can also capture the interpretation of (19.3) in
which there ~s only one woman whom every man admires; but it
cannot capture its other interpretation. (See 1.2.3 above.)
Moreover, a properly branching representation of the next
sentence implies that it has only an absurd reading.
(20) An oak grew from every acorn.
But, as was shown before, it has a perfectly sensible reading a~
well a reading properly branching quantifiers cannot
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represent.
Of course, a theory of quantification in natural language
which ava~ls itself of properly branching quantifiers need not
prohibit representations by improperly branching ones. But if
such a theory permits both kinds of representation, then the
redundancy of the branching quantifiers calls them into
question. And more importantly, if properly branching
quantif~e~s are sometimes assigned and sometimes not assigned,
then the natural question is: what determines the assignment?
And this is the question which Hintikka never addresses.
It is not easy to ascertain whether O~ not Hintjkka is aw~re
of this problem. His purpose is to find sentences in natural
language which can be represented by branching quanti.fier$. At
the same time, however, he seems unaware that his assignment of
branching quantifiers to sentences has no basis in the structure
of sentences. This is suggested 1n one brief passage (Hintikka
1973).<4> Hintikka considers the sentence
(21) John has shown all his paintings to some of his friends.
And he points out that it has two construals, which he says can
be represented qS follows:
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(22)
Vy (y is a painting of John's) ----> 3x (x is a friend
of John's and John has shown y to x»).
(23)
3x (x is a friend of John's and Vy (y is a painting of
John's -~--> John has shown y to x»).
Hintikka claims the latter construal to be the more natural by
far. He goes on to assert ,that (21)'s second construal is better
represented by properly branching quantification, as follows:
(24)
JX/ (x is a friend of John's and (y is a painting of John's
---> John has shown x to y»
~
But this is just a more complex instance of the same issue rai.sed
with respect to (19.3). As with (21) so with (20), there is one
interpretation which properly branching quantifiers cannot
represent, namely, the one where the universal quantifier has
wider scope than the existential one -~ (22) in the case just
mentioned.<5> Thus, impruperly branching quantifiers are
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required as well as properly branching ones. Hence, the question
arises: when are properly branching ones required and when are
improperly branching ones required? Hintikka does not provide a
way to choose; instead, he simply asserts that "the most natural
explanation of the actually preferred reading (23) of (21) here
is to assume that the two quantifiers in (21) are
independent".<6> Here, what Hintikka means by "independent" is
that the speaker, or hearer, does not have enough information to
relate the quantifiers to each other, and hence, for him, the
quantiiiers are informationally independent. But this is no
explanation at all: what information is available to a speaker,
or hearer, is irrelevant to the question of the ambiguity here.
Ask anyone whether sentence (19.3), or other sentences like it,
is ambiguous, and he will make the judgement that it is, despite
the fact that the sentence is completely out of context for him,
and so despite the fact he has no information about the real
world pertinent to the construal of the sentence in question.
This view of Hintikka's contrasts with the view of
quantification in natural language presented here. The latter
makes ve~y specific predications about the relations of scope for
quantifiers in sentences -- and, in particular, sentences in (19)
~- on the basis of their syntactic structure. The fo~mer view
does not.
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6.3.1 A Case for Representation ~ Branchin~Quantification
Having anticipated one pervasive shortcoming of Hintikka's
treatment of quantification in natural language, let me turn now
to one of his candidates for representation by branching
quantifiers:
(25) Some book by every author is referred
to in some essay by every critic.
According to Hintikka (1973),<6> this sentence is to be
represented as follows:
(26)
( 'Ix: author x) (3y: book y) > (y is by x I' W is by v "
essay w) y is referred
to in w) •
("'v; critic v ) (3w:
In contrast, QR assigns three logically distinct interpretations to
(25); namely,
(27)
(Yx: author x)(~y: book y)(Vv: critic v)(3w: essay w)
(y is by x ~ w is by v ~ y is referred to in w).
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(28)
(Vv: critic v)(3w: essay w)(Vx: author x)(Jy: book y)
(y is by x A W is by v ~ y is referred to in w).
\
I
\
(29)
(¥x: author x)(Vv: critic v)(3y: book Y)(3w: essay w)
(y is by x ~ w is by v ~ y is referred to in w).
That is, derived tram the ph~ase marker of (25) at SS, namely,
(30)
s
AUXNPNP~ "pp
/\ / \Q N ~ NP
Q/ "N
VP
v/ ~pp
p/ "'NP
N( "'PP
/ \ I '"Q N P NP
I \
Q N
I I
some book by every author is referred to in some essay by every critic
are from phrase markers equivalent to (29), one equivalent to
(28) anQ one equivalent to (27).
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Now what are the logical connections among the
representations (26), (27), (28), and (29)? It is that (26)
implieR (27) and (28), neither (27) nor (28) implies the other,
but both imply (29).
(29)
/ ~
(27) (28)
~/
(26)
Figure 1
The easiest way to see whqt these implications are is to observe
the kind of rchemata in the formal language of the theory of
finite, partially ordered quantification each of (26) through
(29) instantiate:
(29) VxYv3yaw Fxyvw
(27) Vx3yVvaw Fxyvw (28) Vv3wVx3y Fxyvw
Vx3y
(26) > Fxyvw
't/v3w
Figure 2
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Next, recall what was shown at the end of section 6.l, namely,
that each of these schemata have a second order equivalent.
(29) 3f3g~x~v F x f(x,v) v g(x,v)
(27) 3f3gVxVv F x f(x) v g(x,v) (28) 3f3gVx¥v F x f(x,v) v g(v)
(26) 3f3gVxVv F x f(x) v g(v)
Figure 3
As was pointed out in the same place, everyone-place function is
a special case of a two-place function. One can see, in Figure 3
then, that (26) is a special case of both (27) and (28) and that
they are both special cases of (29). So (27) and (28) are
satisfied in all the models that (26) is satisfied in; and (29)
is satisfied in all the models that either (27) or (28) are
satisfied in.
Moreover, (26) through (29) are logically distinct. To see
this, one merely needs to stipulate models so that for any pair
of these formulae, one is satisfied in one of the models and the
other is not. Since the relations expressed in the formulae are
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all binary, one can turn to the diagrams of directed graphs for
the representation of the models to be stipulated below. In
these diagrams, nodes, which are labelled, represent individuals
in the domain of the model, and directd arcs between individuals
represent relations between individuals. "A" labels an
individual author; "B", an individual book; "C", an individual
critic; and "E", an individual essay ..
The first model consists in two authors, two critics, two
books and two essays. ~here are also two one-~place functions:
one maps authors into books, say the best selling book by
and the other maps critics into essays, say the longest
essay by • Finally, there is a binary relation, namely
referred to in, which books bear to essays. Using labelled
circles to represent individuals and directed arrows to represent
relations and functions, one can depict the model in the
following diagram.
MODEL 1:
A,-------IM
Figure 4
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ac.-------@
,...-----.... c"
It is clear from how the model is set up that (26) is satisfied
in it: a book relevant to an essay depends on the author alone,
and similarly an essay relevant to a book depends on the critic
alone. Naturally, (27), (28), and (29) are satisfied in it as
well.
In the second model, there are two authors, two critics, two
books and four essays. In this model, there are two functions.
One is a one-place function, mapping authors onto books (the
bestselling book by). The other is a two~place function,
mapping a pair, consisting of a critic and an author, onto an
essay (an obituary essay on by). And finally,
there is a binary relation, borne by books to obituary essays,
the relation of being refe~red to in. Again, a diagram will
represent the particulars.
MODEL 2
Figure 5
Now, (26) is not satisfied in the model depicted above precisely
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because the appropriate essay for the relation to obtain with
respect to a book depends on both the choice of critic and the
choice of author. But thi~ is exactly what is required by (27).
So (27) is satisfied in this model. Again, since (27) implies
(29), (29) is also satisfied in this model. However, (28) is not
satisfied in it. Whereas the choice of both is vac~ously a
function of the choice of author and critic, since it is only a
function of the choice of author; the choice of essay, in
contrast, may depend both on the choice of author and the choice
of critic. Indeed, this is shown in the next model.
Again, there are two authors and two critics; but instead of
two books and tour essays, as in the last model, there are four
books a~d two essays. There is, once more, the binary relation
of books to essays, the relation of being referred to in, and
there are two functions: the one~place function of the first
model which maps c~itics onto their essays (the longest essay by
_______), and a two-place function which maps authors onto their
books (authoring).
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MODEL 3
.......---...... c
Figure 6
This model is the mi~ror image of Model 2, and analogous
reasoning to that in the previous paragraph applies. (26) is not
satisfied since the choice of the appropriate book for the
relation to obtain with respect to the essay depends on both the
choice of critic and th~ choice of author. But (26) cannot take
account of both these choices. Neither can (27) take account of
both these choices, so it too fails in the model. But (28) can
accomodate both choices, as is reflected by its logical
equivalent in second order logic in the assertion of the
existence of a function of two variables mapping pairs of authors
aOQ critics into essays. Of course since (28) is satisfied in
Model 3, then (29) is too.
It should be evident in the last model, given below,
satisfies (29) but does not satisfy either (27) or (28) (and so,
does not satisfy (26)).
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MODEL 4
Figure 7
Now that the interpretations ascribed to Hintikka's sentence
(25) by the two competing proposals are clear and differentiated,
the question of which proposal is correct can be addressed. One
obstacle, however, stands in the way. The data are difficult to
pin down: judgments are frequently uncertain or unclear. Thore
are two reasons for this. First, the sentence itself is rather
comp~ex. Second, the interpretation ascribed to (25) by Hintikka
implies the interpretations ascribed to (25) by QR. These two
reasons should not be taken as grounds to belittle the
investigation into the issue as trivial or esoteric. It is a
fact of scientific investigation that as a theory becomes more
comprehensive, then the data needed to adjudicate between
competing hypotheses formulated within the theory become more
arcane and difficult to find. What this translates into in the
physical sciences is the growing sophistication of
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instrumentation (among other things). So, then, how is one to
decide between the two proposals?
Fauconnier (1975) provides a way of eliciting judgments more
clearly and ~n a way more telling of the basis for the judgment.
Instead of asking for a judgment of a single sentence, such as
(25), Fauconnier (1975: 559~560), in effect, asks for jUdgments
concerning the consistency of sets of sentences. For example,
are these sentences consistent?
(31)
1. A man loves only one woman at a time.
2. A dancer belongs to only one ballet troupe at a time.
3. Some player of every NFL team loves some dancer of every
ballet troupe.
If Hintikka's reading is the only one, then this triplet can be
satisfied only in models with one NFL team which has only one
player and one ballet troupe which has only one dancer. But this
is not the judgment of ~peakers. Similar considerations apply to
another triplet.
(32)
1. A spy l~ves in only one house at a time.
2. A house is only in one city.
3. Some spy of every firm lives in some house of eve: y major
city.
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What Fauconnier has shown, then, is that Hintikka's
representation of (24), and sentences like it, imposes too narrow
a range of interpretation. In contrast, QR provides a
representation which accomodates the range of interpretation
required for the judgments Fauconnier gets at with his examples,
for these examples fall within the range of interpretation
imposeo by representations of the same form as (29) (the
logically weakest of the representations generated by QR), and
its analogues.
Finally, Fauconnier (1975: 560-561) suggests that one
consider sentences like (24) framed in terms such that the
background assumptions shared by speakers will determine the
truth or falsity of the sentence. Mathematics, in particular
elementary number theory, provides such a background. Taking
"successor of", not in the sense of an immediate successor, bl~t
in the sense of being greater than, Fauconnier asks if the
following sentence is true in the theory of natural numbers.
(33) Some successor of every even number is a multiple
of some successor of every odd number.
To see that this is true, let ~ be an even number and 2 an odd
number. e(o+l), which 1s a successor of ~, is a mUltiple of 0+1,
which is a successor of o. On Hintikka's interpretation ~ and 2
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can be picked lndependently of one another and the relation of
being a multiple of will be satisfied. But this is false: if
f(e) is a successor of ~, it cannot be a multiple of any 2
greater than f(e). Hence whatever one picks as a function which
yields successors for the denotation of the word "successor" in
the phrase "some successor of every even number" must be a
function of both the even and odd numbers picked; but the
function one picks which yields successors for the denotation of
the word "successor" in the phrase nsome successor of every odd
number" need be a function of only the odd numbers picked. But
QR provides such a reading, namely the reading whose
representation has the same form as (25) above. To see this,
recall that the corresponding formulae in Figures 2 and 3 are
logically equivalent; now, let the two-place successor function
above correspond with "f" and the one-place successor function
above correspond with "g" in the schema (25) of Figure 3.
Finally, a reading which has a representation whose form is the
same as that of (26) is easily got from (33):
(34) Some successor of every even number is
a factor of some successor of every odd n~mber.
6.3.2 Another Case !££ Representation ~ Branching Quantifiers
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The same considerations just adduced with regard to
Hintikka's first sentence (1.1), apply, by parity of reasoning,
to his second sentence (1.2), repeated below for the reader's
convenience.
(35) Some relative of every villager and some relative
of every townsman hate each other.
If the reading ascribed by Hintikka to (35) is correct, then each
of the following analogues of (35) should be false.
(36)
1. Some son of every village-father and some daughter of every
town-mother are married to each other.
2. Some chord of every circle and some chord of every ellipse
are parallel to each other.
But, they are true. (36.1) is true when the form of its
representation is the same as (29); and (27.2) is true when the
form of its representation is the same as either (29) or (28).
But these are the representations which are licensed by OR.
Moreover, it is not even clear how Hintikka expects to
represent (35). The following will not do.
(37)
(Vx: townsman x)(3y: y relative of X» y
hates w
(Vv; villager v)(Jw: w relative of v)
But this fails to express the fact that "w hf\tes y" is true
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whenever "w hates y". This lacuna can be filled:
(38)
(Vx: townsman x)(3y: y relative of x) >
(y hates w ~ w hates y)
(~v: villager v)(3w: w relative of v)
But this won't work, for as Langendoen (1978) has shown, the
effect of the interpretation of the reciprocal pronoun on the
interpretation of the verb to which it is an argument. ,.:..annot be
cashed out as a reciprocal relation (i.e., a relation which holds
for all distinct pairs) on a set of individuals. (See 4.3.2
above and the discussion of examples (19) - (34) in 5.1 above.)
In contrast, the semantic and syntactic principles adopted
or developed in the earlier parts of the thesis provide a
straightforward analysis of (35). A detail by detail
presentation of such an analysis, though available, would be
tedious, in light of the sheer complexity of the sentence.
However, the sketch of such an analysis, which is to be given,
should make evident how the details can be filled in. First,
what i.s its syntactic structure? At OS, it has the following
phrase marker.
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(39)
N
other
VP
/'\
V NP.,.
I
s ____
relative
~NP.~NP~ CdNJ NPl~ ,- I / '"
Q /N~ and Q /N"
N PP N PP
/" "P NP P NP
/ " "Q N Q N
I I
N N
I I
of townsman relative of villager each
every some every hate
Some
The mapping to SS is trivial, for there is nothing requiring
movement. At 58, though, the node NP., must be 1 inked. NP~ can
be linked to only one node, if the conditions at SS are to be
met, namely, N~ • (For details, see the discussion of (26) in 5.1
above.) The mapping to L~ is not trivial: there are six
distinct configurations which can result from QR. I shall
consider only one.
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(40)
hate each
-------' 0 the
eand
I I
e
E
I
ee
s~
Sp.~ ~s
'-- ------N P. ~ s
I " 4 / _________
N PP I? -----.. s
/ ~- ~P Q N p~ VP
/ \ ,/" I "
N PP p. CONJ V
/
p
I
some ,of
relative
I
Q
some of
relative
Every
townsman
The interpretation of (40) requires the interpretation of
quantifiers (some, every), non relational count nouns (townsman,
villager), a relational count noun (relative), a reciprocal
pronoun (each, other), and a verb (hate). Principles for the
interpretation of each of these items have been stated. Thus
relative is interpreted as a function from subsets of the domain
into subsets of its extension. The function receives its values
from the interpretation of its internal argument position. Each
of these values is a singleton (if the function is well-defined
in the domain), since the noun phrase nodes N~ and N~ (N~ and
N~ ) have the feature -PL. The values which are the
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~interpretation of N~ (N~) are those assigned by the restricted
quantifier N~ (NP~) which binds it. Continuing from the bottom
to the top of NP~ (NPs )' one sees that the interpretation of Q in
NP~ (N~) takes each singleton assigned to its sister Nand
assigns it to NP, (N~). Again these values will be singletons
in view of the fact that NP, (NP,) has the feature -PL. Finally,
the interpretation of VP, which is essentially the characteristic
function of the reciprocal relation of mutual hatred, is assigned
exactly a pair of singletons. Each singleton in this pair is
ultimately a function of each singleton assigned by the
interpretation of the restricted quantifiers N~ and N~
respectively.
6.4 Conclusion
The upshot of this re-assessment of Hintikka's case for
branching quantifiers as a proper representation for
quantificational aspects of the sentences discussed above is
this. First, he provides no grounds for determining the relation
of scope among the quantifiers of a sentence containing more than
one quantifier. Second, he fails to provide grounds for choosing
branching representations of quantifiers over logically
equivalent but non~branch1ng representations, be they second
order equivalents or first order ones. Mor~over, as Fauconnier
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has shown, there is good evidence to question Hintikka's
judgements. And, as I showed above, this evidence is borne out
by the rule for the assignment of scope to quantifiers (i.e., the
mapping from 58 to LF). Th~s, while Hintikka provides one with a
gloss of the sentences discussed in this chapter, a gloss which
is doubtful, the theory developed or adopted here provides a
complete syntactic and semantic analysis of them.
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER SIX
1. See Saarinen (ed) 1979.
2. (5) is derived from (4) and, in general, a formula in
prenex normal form is derived from one not in such a form
-- by the meta-theoretical fact that formulae which are
alphabetic variants of one another are logically equivalent
and from the following theorems (where "p" is any formula
not containing the variable "x").
1. (p --->3xFx) ~-->3x(p ---> Fx)
2. (p --->VxFx) ~-->Vx(p ---> Fx)
3. (VxFx ---> p) ~-->3x(Fx ---> p)
4. (3xFx ---> p) ~-->Vx(Fx ---> p)
3. Of course, "Vv3wVx3yFxyvw" is the other possible formula
made from the same parts. But for what I am about to say,
it makes no different which ne is considered.
4. Saarinen (ed) 1979: 67.
5. There are some minor alterations of what Hintikka actually
says which I have availed myself of but which do not affect
the point I am making. First, in the citation, I have
substituted my numbering for his. Second, Hintikka"s
example of (21) actually has "not shown any" instead of
"shown all". However, in treating his actual example, he
claims that the occurrence of "not" in his original example
does not militate against his claim of ambiguity in the
sentence, since the ambiguity obtains in sentences like my
(21). The reader must conclude, then, that the point being
made carries over, mutatis mutandis, to my (21).
6. Ibid. 69.
7. I have taken the liberty of using generalized quantifie~s
in Hintikka"s representation. Since the quantifiers in
this example are existential and universal, the
representations are equivalent to those with simple
universal and existential quantifiers.
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CONCLUSION
What, then, may one conclude from the foregoing chapters
about the form of representation for the quantificational aspects
of the sentences in the class surveyed? One concludes: first,
that the class of quantifiers in English is bounded, being
limited to a dozen or so determiners and a few pronouns lexically
derived from some of the determiners; second, that the
quantifiers are restricted first order quantifiers; and third,
that scope, which is defined in terms of a-command, is a total
o~dering of quantifier noun phrases in a phrase marker (of the
sentences surveyed) at LF.
These results are at odds with those who claim that among
the sentences surveyed there are ones requiring branching
quantifiers ana ones requiring second order quantifiers. The
third result conflicts with Hintikka's claim that the two
sentences treated in the last chapter have quantified noun
phrases which are only partially ordered with respect to one
another in their logical form. As was shown, however, Hintikka's
oonstrual of the pair of sentences adduced is persuasively
impugned by Fauconnier (1975) and the construal of Fauconnier
sustained by the rule of QR (i.e., the mapping from SS to LF),
introduced by May (1977). The second result conflicts with the
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claim, implicit in Langendoen (1978) and explicit in Lauri
Carlson (1982), that plural noun phrases require second order
quantifiers for their proper representation.
The type of argument used by Carlson (1982; Part I, Sect. 2
and Appendix 1) and others runs as follows. A sentence in
English is represented by a formula of second order logic. The
implicit claim is that the sentence and the second order formula
are true in all and only the same models, hence they are
logically equivalent. Then, the second order formula is shown to
have no first order equivalent, in particular, that there is at
least one model in which the second order formula is true but in
which no first order formula is true. From this, it follows that
the sentence has no first order formula logically equivalent to
it. But the argument is misleading.
It is well known, for example, that set theory can be
axiomatized either in a first order language or in a second order
language. However, for the axiomatizations to be logically
equivalent parameter~ of the formulation in a first order
language must be set. Typically, this means that the quantifiers
must range at least over classes (in the sense of Von Neumann)
and that two distinct two~place predicates must be set as
equality and membership. Similarly, elementary number theory can
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be axiomatized either in a first order language or in a second
o~der language. Again, logical equivalence can be attained only
when some of the parameters of the first order language are set.
(See Enderton 1972: 67-72.) The most the type of argument is
entitled to conclude is that the formula of first order logic
none of whose parameters are fixed is logically equivalent to teh
sentence in question.
But even this qualified conclusion may be too much. Notice
that an essential step in the argument above is to find a second
order formula which is logically equivalent to the sentence in
question. The conclusion is persuasive only insofar as the gloss
in second order logic is equivalent to the given sentence. But
as was seen at several different points in the thesis, judgements
of the range of interpretation of a sentence can result either
from grammatical considerations (i.e., syntactic and semantic) or
from conceptual or aoxic considerations. Thus, it was argued
that a sentence like "an oak grew from every acorn" has two,
logically distinct phrase markers at LF, though it seems to have
only one. (See the discussion of (39) 1n 1.2.3 above,) It was
also argued that, contrary to appearances, sentences like "the
man surrounded the town" are grammatical (i.e., syntactically and
semanticqlly well-formed), though conceptually and doxically
odd. The upshot of these considerations is that the glossing of
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a sentence by a formula, be it first, second, or whatever order,
is just not compelling in the absence of a more comprehensive
syntactic and semantic theory.
So, what would be compelling? What would be compelling
would be to show that the very characteristic which distinguishes
a second order langauge from a first order one is found in the
proper representation of the logical form of a sentence in some
language. (See 1.0 above.) But what is the characteristic? It
is a syntactic one: i.n a first order language, positions in
which bindable items occur are only argument positions; in a
second order language, predicate positions are bindable too. Is
there a sentence whose predicate can be bound? Surely, if
anything is a predicate in natural language, it is the verb
phrase. If verb phrases in English could be bound, one would
expect, as Higginbotham has pointed out, to find sentences like:
1.1 The men somewhat
1.2 The entertainer everythin~s
(where "somewhat" is q verb meaning "does something" and
"everything" is a verb meaning "doe:3 everything".) But no
language is known to have such verbs, or verb phrases. In fact,
on the view adopted o~ developed in this thesis for the class of
sentences treated, there is a natural definition of "predicate":
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it is any syntactic expression whose distinguished argument is
unsaturated (i.e#, una$signed within the expression). Such
expressions are adjectives (as well as adjective phrases) and
verbs (as well as verb ph~ases). But such expressions are never
bound, and probably is ~or the class of sentences examined. One
concludes, then, that these sentences do not, in any
linguistically pertinent sense, have second order quantifiers¥
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